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Charter Rights & Health Care Funding:
A Typology of Canadian Health Rights Litigation
Colleen M Flood
YY. Brandon Chen**
I. INTRODUCTION
As biomedical technologies continue to advance, Canadian Medicare,
like other health care systems around the world, faces an ever more difficult
task of meeting rising consumer expectations with finite resources.
Although it is commonly accepted that some limits on the coverage of the
public health care system are necessary in the interest of sustainability,
there is as yet no consensus among the Canadian public on where those
limits should be drawn. While the Canada Health Act mandates public
funding for "medically necessary" hospital services and "medically
required" physician services,' it offers no definition of what constitutes
medical necessity. As such, the exact list of medical procedures and
treatments to be covered by the public health insurance plans has
traditionally been left to be negotiated between the provinces and their
respective medical associations. These decisions, as one would expect, are
often ripe for contest.
By way of legal challenges, over the past decade the Canadian public has
demanded a greater role in the decision-making process with regard to the
allocation of health care resources. On their quest, health consumers in
Canada have employed a variety of legal strategies, including launching
mass tort claims, requesting administrative reviews, and bringing
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1. Canada Health Act, R.S.C., ch. C 6, § 2 (1985).
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constitutional challenges. For example, in Cilinger v. Centre Hospitalier de
Chicoutimi, a class action was certified against twelve Quebec hospitals for
having allowed breast cancer patients to wait longer than the medically
recommended eight weeks for radiation therapy.2 In Stein v. Quebec, a
Quebec man successfully argued that the refusal by an administrative
tribunal to pay for his out-of-country cancer treatment was patently
unreasonable considering the amount of time he had waited to receive the
procedure in the province. 3 In Lalonde v. Ontario, the Ontario
government's decision to restructure a francophone hospital was challenged
by area residents and quashed by courts on the ground that it failed to
comply with the constitutional principle of protection of minorities. 4
Of these lawsuits, those based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms5 arguably gain the highest profile. Since its enactment in 1982,
the Charter has provided constitutional protection for Canadians' basic
6
rights and freedoms against infringement from laws or state actions.
Section 24(1) of the Charter stipulates that anyone whose rights are
violated "may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such
remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. ' 7
As such, increasingly health consumers in Canada are turning to their
Charter rights - most notably the right to life, liberty and security of the
person guaranteed under section 7 and the equality rights under section 15 -
as another avenue to contest governmental limits on publicly funded health
care. In the face of growing wait times within the public health care system,
2. Cilinger c. Centre Hospitalier de Chicoutimi, [2004] R.J.Q. 2943 (Can.), aff'd [2004]
R.J.Q. 3083 (Sup. Ct.).
3. Stein v. Quebec (Tribunal administratif), [1999] R.J.Q. 2416 (Sup. Ct.).
4. Lalonde v. Ontario (Health Services Restructuring Commission), [2001], 208 D.L.R.
(4th) 577 (Ont. C.A.), aff'd(1999), 181 D.L.R. (4th) 263 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
5. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Charter].
6. See id § 52(1). This provision affirms the supremacy of the Constitution of Canada
and stipulates that "any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to
the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."
7. See id § 24(1). Kent Roach has argued that although section 24(1) allows applicants
to seek both positive and negative remedies, with respect to health rights litigation, courts
have generally been more inclined to grant negative remedies because of their simplicity. For
example, in Chaoulli, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada noted that "the
[applicants] do not seek an order that the government spend more money on health care, nor
do they seek an order that waiting times for treatment under the public health care scheme be
reduced." Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 2005 SCC 35 (Can.).
As such, although it was possible for the applicants in Chaoulli to seek positive remedies,
their decision to seek only a negative remedy arguably made their positions more attractive
to the Court. See Kent Roach, The Courts and Medicare: Too Much or Too Little Judicial
Activism, in ACCESS TO CARE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER PRIVATE
HEALTH INSURANCE IN CANADA 184, 193-95 (Colleen M. Flood, Kent Roach & Lome Sossin,
eds., 2005).
[Vol. 19
2
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 19 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol19/iss3/5
Canadian Health Rights Litigation
the Charter has now been used to challenge the statutory prohibition on
private health insurance as well, as seen in the case of Chaoulli v. Quebec.
Such phenomenon of relying on litigation as a means towards socio-
political reform has been termed by scholars as "legal mobilization."8 It
entails an organized effort to influence policy outcomes by asserting one's
rights, thus refraining a socio-political issue into a legal one. 9 In the context
of health care resource allocation, attempts at legal mobilization coincide
with a growing demand from patients to hold administrators and providers
of health care accountable vis-A-vis them as consumers of the services.'l
To-date, such health rights litigation has had mixed successes in the
Canadian courtrooms." The juridical outcomes of health rights litigation,
however, often do not tell the whole story about their actual ramifications
on the Canadian health care system. Whereas some legal successes have yet
to be fully implemented on the ground, some cases that failed in the
courtrooms have nonetheless rallied political support around the cause and
even instigated policy changes.12
In this paper, we will analyze the impact on Canadian Medicare resulting
from legal actions, focusing specifically on lawsuits argued on the basis of
the Charter because of their nation-wide implications and rights-based
nature. Our goal is to devise a typology for health rights litigation in
Canada, taking into consideration not only legal outcomes but also the
subsequent effects of these cases on governmental policies and public
sentiments. In so doing, we seek to expose the limitations of Charter
challenges in effecting the resource allocation desired by health consumers.
At the extreme end of these limitations is the potential for negative court
decisions to foreclose efforts at reform launched outside of the courtroom.
Meanwhile, we will showcase the possibility of attaining health policy
changes through well organized advocacy campaigns despite courtroom
losses. We argue that the impact of health rights litigation on the publicly-
funded health care depends heavily on political contexts. It follows that, on
the micro level, health rights advocates and legal counsels should not only
assess the merits of their cases, but also weigh the likelihood of their
endeavours accomplishing the sought-after changes against potential
8. Christopher P. Manfredi & Antonia Maioni, The Last Line of Defence for Citizens:
Litigating Private Health Insurance in Chaoulli v. Quebec, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 249, 251
(2006).
9. Id. at 250-51; See e.g., Christopher P. Manfredi & Antonia Maioni, Reversal of
Fortune: Litigating Health Care Reform in Auton v. British Columbia, 29 SUP. CT. L. REV.
(2d) 111 (2005) (illustrating legal mobilization).
10. PATRICK J. MONAHAN, CHAOULLI V. QUEBEC AND THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN HEALTH
CARE: PATIENT ACCOUNTABILITY AS THE 'SIX PRINCIPLE' OF THE CANADA HEALTH ACT
(2006), http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/benefactors-lecture_2006.pdf.
11. See Manfredi & Maioni, supra note 8.
12. Id.
2010]
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negative political repercussions before proceeding with Charter challenges.
On the macro level, one needs to look beyond the successes or failures of
the lawsuits themselves to truly ascertain whether or not a rights-based
approach to health care is achieving progressive or regressive outcomes.
3
II. FORMULATION OF TYPOLOGY
The two variables implicated in our typology of health rights litigation
are the juridical outcomes of the cases and the impact of the lawsuits on the
Canadian health care landscape. With respect to the first variable, final
court decisions can be bifurcated into those found in favour of plaintiffs and
those against. In terms of the second variable, our focus is on the effect of
health rights litigation on shaping public discourse, instigating policy
development and bringing about changes in service coverage and delivery.
To ascertain these impacts, we reviewed opinion polls, editorials, news
stories, journal articles, book chapters and reports published by the
governments and NGOs. By cross tabulating these two variables, we
identify at least five outcomes that may result from health rights litigation.
First, successful Charter challenges can lead to courts granting
Canadians a positive right to a particular therapy, or to care within
reasonable time limits. Provided the courts' ruling is faithfully observed by
governments and service providers, this is arguably the best result that
plaintiffs could hope for when initiating legal actions. As will be discussed
further in the next section, health rights litigation has only very rarely, if
13. We consider progressive distribution of health resources as consisting of a system
that is funded according to one's ability to pay while it provides services on the basis of
one's medical needs. In other words, there should be a decoupling of health care provision
from patients' ability to pay. A regressive form of health resources allocation, on the other
hand, places greater financial burden on those less well-off, who often are in turn more
disadvantaged by the social determinants of health. Viewed in this light, the Supreme Court
of Canada's decision in Chaoulli to allow for the sales of private health insurance, for
example, is considered by us to have a regressive impact on the public health care system.
However, we acknowledge that it is not always an easy task to characterize the impact of
health rights litigation in such a binary manner. For instance, in Auton, the Supreme Court
rejected a Charter challenge by families of autistic children who were seeking public
funding for ABA/IB1 treatments. Auton v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] 3
S.C.R. 657, 2004 SCC 78 (Can.). On the one hand, this ruling can be characterized as
affecting a regressive outcome. Since many of these families were unable to pay for
ABA/IBI programs out-of-pocket, denial of public health coverage would effectively leave
the medical needs of these autistic children unattended. On the other hand, some experts
have questioned the empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of the ABA/IBI
treatment. They argue that public funding for ABA/IBI treatments, given their high price tag
and questionable medical benefits, would divert resources from other health programs whose
clinical benefits may be better established but enjoy less public attention and/or political
support. From this perspective, one may consider the Auton decision as progressive. For
further discussions on the cost-effectiveness of ABA/IBI treatment, see Greschner & Lewis,
infra note 1755.
[Vol. 19
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ever, brought about the enforcement of positive rights in Canada. The
closest we believe that Canadian plaintiffs have come is to successfully
establish a right to equal treatment in respect of access to certain health
services through litigation (e.g. sign language interpretation services for the
hearing impaired) but then to see it largely fail to be implemented on the
ground. As such, juridical successes followed by under-enforcement of the
court orders represent another potential outcome of health rights litigation
in our typology. This second outcome is possible because the governments
may lack the infrastructure or capacity necessary to comply with the court
orders or simply may lack the political will to do so.
The third potential outcome of Charter-based health rights litigation is
the establishment of a negative right. That is, health consumers can
successfully convince courts to invalidate a piece of legislation or a
government action that has unconstitutionally interfered with their access to
certain medical treatments or services. Most health rights challenges that
have succeeded in Canada fall into this category.' 4 The rights conferred by
courts in these cases, nevertheless, are only negative in nature. As such,
although the governments may not legally prohibit Canadians from
accessing certain health care, they equally do not have the legal obligation
to actively make these services readily available. Consequently, these
lawsuits do not necessarily give rise to barrier-free access to the sought-
after health services by consumers, and the practical impact of these
lawsuits on the allocation of health care resources has thus far remained
limited.
The prior three outcomes all flow from the direct consequences of a legal
decision. In contrast, health consumers can fail in their legal pursuit of a
right but galvanize public support, or at least soften resistance, in the
process. That is, Charter-based health rights litigation, due to its high
profile, can instigate public discourses around the issue in question. In some
cases, public sympathy towards the plaintiffs' circumstances has put
pressure on the governments to undertake political actions. 15 Although this
fourth possible outcome of health rights litigation may be interpreted by
some as suggesting that there is no downside to initiating such legal actions,
the fifth and last outcome in our typology serves as a cautionary tale. In
these cases, not only did the health rights challenges fail in the courtrooms,
but they also set back the momentum of accomplishing the desired changes
through political means as the governments are content with leaving the
14. See e.g., R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 1988 SCC 90 (Can.) (striking down
government intrusion in the form of criminal sanctions regarding abortion); Rodriguez v.
British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.) (assisted suicide); R. v.
Parker, [2000] 49 O.R. (3d) 481 (Can.) (marijuana possession).
15. See Ellie Venhola, Goliath Arisen: Taking Aim at the Health Care Regime in Auton,
20 J. LAW & Soc. POL'Y 67, 68 (2005).
2010]
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final words on the issues to courts.
In the next section, we will elaborate on these various outcomes that may
result from health rights litigation. Specific cases will be drawn to clarify
and support our typology.
III. TYPOLOGY OF HEALTH RIGHTS LITIGATION
A. Positive Right to Health, and Successful Implementation
The best outcome that health consumers can arguably hope for when
launching health rights litigation is to have the courts pronounce a legal
entitlement to the sought-after medical services, and to subsequently have
the governments take positive measures to ensure such services are
accessible to consumers. Unlike the constitutions of some countries,' 6 the
Canadian Charter does not confer a freestanding positive right to health
care. As such, Canadian legal scholars and patients who seek to establish
entitlements to public-funded health services have grounded their
endeavours primarily in two sections of the Charter, namely sections 7 and
15. Section 7 of the Charter provides that "[e]veryone has the right to life,
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."' 17 Some
scholars have argued that this section is capable of being interpreted by
courts to include a positive right to accessible medical care.' 8 In addition,
some have built their claims on the non-discrimination guarantee enshrined
in section 15(1) of the Charter, which states: "Every individual is equal
before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability."' 9 While section 15(1) does not protect
a positive right to health care per se, when the denial of certain health
services to a section of the population is found by courts to be
discriminatory, this provision can oblige the governments to take positive
actions towards remedying such inequality.
In Gosselin v. Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada wrestled with the
16. See e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 27 (subsection 1(a) stipulates: "Everyone has the
right to have access to health care services, including reproductive health care").
17. Charter, supra note 5, at §5, s. 7.
18. See e.g., Lome Sossin, "Towards a Two-Tier Constitution? The Poverty of Health
Rights," in Colleen M. Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds., ACCESS TO CARE, ACCESS
TO JUSTICE: THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN CANADA 161, 170-71;
Martha Jackman, DISCUSSION PAPER No. 31: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION 7 OF THE
CHARTER FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING IN CANADA 5-8 (Saskatoon: Commission on the
Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002).
19. Charter, supra note 5, at §5.
[Vol. 19
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scope of section 7 - namely, whether its guarantee applies to
socioeconomic as well as legal rights, and whether it entails positive in
addition to negative rights - in the context of social assistance. 20 Arbour J.
in dissent, with L'Heureux-Dube J. concurring on point, answered both
questions affirmatively. 21 They were of the view that section 7 extends
protection to cases involving not only legal rights but also economic
rights.22 Arbour J. argued that "[a]s s. 7 jurisprudence has developed, new
kinds of interest, quite apart from those engaged by one's dealings with the
justice system and its administration, have been asserted and found to be
deserving of s. 7 protection.' 23 She further characterized the rights
guaranteed by section 7 as containing both negative and positive
dimensions. That is, "in certain contexts the state's choice to legislate over
some matter may constitute state action giving rise to a positive obligation
under s. 7. ,24 Accordingly, in the dissent's view, the Quebec government's
decision to legislate in regards to welfare meant that it had assumed positive
obligations to ensure the amount of social assistance would meet the basic
needs of recipients.25 The government's failure to meet its obligations
would therefore violate the welfare recipients' right to security and, in some
cases, life. Drawing a parallel between social assistance and health care,
both dealing with necessities of life, this very reasoning can be used to
support the claim that section 7 gives Canadians a positive right to have
access to basic health care.
Although the majority of the Supreme Court did not go as far as did
Arbour and L'Heureux-Dube JJ., their examination of section 7
jurisprudence did lead them to accept the possibility that section 7 "could
be read to encompass economic rights, 26 and that "one day s. 7 may be
interpreted to include positive obligations., 27 Nonetheless, they concluded
that this case did not warrant such interpretation of section 7 as there was
insufficient evidence concerning the alleged economic hardship
experienced by young welfare recipients.28 Cases subsequent to Gosselin
have seemingly confirmed the applicability of section 7 to socioeconomic
contexts - most notably, in Chaoulli, section 7 rights were found to have
been triggered by a legislative prohibition against purchase and sale of
20. Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, 2002 SCC 84 (Can.).
21. Id. at paras. 311-29 (Arbour J., dissenting); id. at para. 141 (L'Heureux-Dube J.,
dissenting).
22. Id. at paras. 311-13 (Arbour J., dissenting).
23. Id. at para. 317.
24. Id. at para. 328.
25. See id
26. Gosselin supra note 20, at para. 81 (majority opinion).
27. Id. at para. 82.
28. Id. at para. 83.
2010]
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private health insurance in the face of long wait times. 29 Despite these
findings, it remains unclear as to when positive state obligations under
section 7 may arise. On the one hand, Canadian courts have repeatedly cited
Gosselin as authority for the proposition that section 7 may, under the right
circumstances, confer positive duties upon the governments. 30 As such, it is
conceivable that health rights litigation grounded in section 7 could one day
compel the government to provide certain medical services as necessities of
life. On the other hand, the courts have been equally persistent in declining
to interpret section 7 in such a positive light when invited by claimants to
do so. For example, in Flora v. Ontario Health Insurance Plan, the Ontario
Court of Appeal ruled that the constitutional jurisprudence hitherto
concerning section 7 did not impose a positive obligation on the
government to fund out-of-country medical treatments even when the
procedures were considered life-saving. 31 This reluctance to recognize
positive social rights under the Charter may be explained by, inter alia, the
philosophy of some judges that see spending decisions, and the balancing of
the competing priorities that they entail, as falling under the responsibility
of the executive rather than the judiciary. As a case in point, Binnie and
LeBel JJ. cautioned in Chaoulli against founding a positive right to health
care upon section 7 because to do so would necessitate the courts to
determine the scope of health services and the length of wait times
32reasonably required by the Constitution. While such an argument has been
criticized by scholars such as Lorne Sossin,33 it remains one of the most
significant hurdles to infusing section 7 with positive state obligations.
Besides section 7, governments in Canada may also be under a positive
obligation to provide certain health services pursuant to section 15(1) of the
Charter. In Andrew v. Law Society of British Columbia, the Supreme Court
of Canada described the purpose of section 15 as "to ensure equality in the
formulation and application of the law. '3 4 The Supreme Court went on to
elaborate in Law v. Canada that section 15(1) aims at "assuring human
29. See also Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2008] 88 B.C.L.R. (4') 116 (Can.) (triggering
section 7 in the context of housing).
30. See e.g., Flora v. Ontario Health Ins. Plan, [2008] 91 O.R. (3d) 412, para. 105
(Can.).
31. Flora, 91 O.R. (3d) 412, atpara. 108.
32. Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, paras. 161-279, 2005
SCC 35 (Can.) (Binnie & LeBel JJ., dissenting).
33. Sossin, supra note 18, at 171-73 (arguing that what the courts are asked to do in such
instances is no different from, say, when the courts are asked to determine how much delay
in holding a hearing is unconstitutional). He opined that courts "can provide guidelines or
tests or criteria that ensure compliance with the Charter without running the public
programs," thus ensuring the division of power. Id.
34. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 1989 SCC 2 (Can.).
[Vol. 19
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dignity by the remedying of discriminatory treatment." 35 As such, the
equality rights protected under section 15 are not positive per se. In other
words, one cannot invoke section 15 to demand the governments to
proactively address existing inequalities in society. However, section 15(1)
prohibits state actions or legislations that discriminate a segment of the
population on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age, mental or physical disability, or some analogous grounds.36 That
is, once the governments have taken certain actions or enacted legislations
that are discriminatory in nature, section 15(1) imposes positive obligations
upon the governments to eliminate such acts of discrimination. According
to McIntyre J. in Andrew, the concept of discrimination is two-fold: first, it
may manifest as perpetuation of prejudice or disadvantage against groups of
individuals due to their personal characteristics; and, second, discrimination
can take the form of stereotyping, where individuals are treated solely in
accordance to their association with a group rather than on the basis of
actual merits and capacities.37
In the context of contesting health resource allocation, section 15 may be
triggered by health consumers in at least two ways. If a provincial
government decides to make certain medical services available to some but
not others, and if such differential treatment can be shown to have violated
the dignity of those denied services, then section 15(1) may be used in court
to establish an entitlement to the health services at issue.38 Moreover, even
when a health program appears to treat everyone in the same manner,
section 15(1) may still be engaged if such equal treatment in fact fails to
take into account the unique need or circumstances of certain groups or
individuals. 39 According to the Supreme Court of Canada, identifying and
remedying this type of discrimination, termed "adverse effect
discrimination," is of particular importance to people with disability.40 It
was said that "[t]he government will rarely single out disabled persons for
discriminatory treatment. More common are laws of general application that
have a disparate impact on the disabled. ' 4 For instance, in Eldridge v.
British Columbia, the Supreme Court ruled that while all British
Columbians might access a set of health services free of charge, the extent
to which deaf individuals could benefit from the health care system was in
35. Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497,
para. 52, 1999 SCC 675 (Can.).
36. See Charter, supra note 5, at § 15(1).
37. See R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, para. 18, 2008 SCC 41 (Can.).
38. See Andrews, supra note 34, at 1 S.C.R 143.
39. See id
40. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, para. 64,
1997 SCC 327 (Can.).
41. Id. at para. 64.
2010]
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actuality compromised vis-d-vis other patients since they were not provided
sign language interpretation and therefore faced unique challenges in
communicating with health care providers.42 The non-provision of sign
language interpretation was therefore found in violation of section 15(1).43
Whether it is grounded on the basis of section 7 or achieved indirectly
through section 15, successful juridical finding of a positive right to
publicly funded health services needs to be implemented in the real world
to achieve a lasting impact for patients. Although theoretically possible, to
date health rights litigation in Canada has not, in our view, engendered an
outcome where the positive obligations found by courts with respect to
certain medical services are then satisfactorily discharged by the
governments. On the one hand, courts have not yet actualized the possibility
of section 7 being interpreted as giving rise to a positive socioeconomic
right. On the other hand, as will be discussed in more detail in the next
section, on the only occasion to our knowledge where the Supreme Court of
Canada has recognized an entitlement to publicly financed health services
based on section 15 - namely, in Eldridge - the provinces' implementation
of the court decision has been disappointing.44
B. Positive Right to Health, but Failed Implementation
The second potential outcome that may result from health rights
litigation involves the successful establishment of a positive right in court
followed by failures to have it enforced on the ground.
In Eldridge, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
deaf patients are entitled to government funded sign language interpretation
42. Id. at para. 71.
43. Id. atpara. 80.
44. See also Sossin, supra note 18, at 170-73. Although our typology has categorized
health rights litigation into those seeking positive rights versus those seeking negative rights,
Kent Roach and Lome Sossin have questioned whether it is fruitful for jurists to continue to
engage in this line of dichotomized debate. According to Roach, rather than framing an
action as based on either a positive or a negative right, a more productive exercise would be
to analyze health rights litigation based on the remedies sought and/or granted. Our
reservation with the remedy-based analysis, however, is that Canadian courts have at times
categorically refused to entertain claims of positive rights as in Flora. In such cases, the
success or failure of a litigation arguably hinges on the characterization of the rights that one
aims to establish rather than the nature of the remedies that one seeks flowing from the rights
infringement. That is, in these cases, courts have sometimes ruled that the applicant's rights -
being positive in nature - are not per se protected under the Charter, instead of recognizing
the applicant's rights but refusing to grant a certain remedy. As such, we see the value in
structuring a typology based on the positive/negative rights dichotomy. On the other hand,
Sossin has argued against the distinction between positive and negative rights on the basis
that such dichotomy is illusory. See Sossin, supra note 18 and accompanying text. While we
do not dispute Sossin's observation, we wish to emphasize that the goal of our typology is
mainly to devise a framework for analysing Canadian health rights litigation to-date rather
than to steer the judiciary towards a certain path of normative changes.
[Vol. 19
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while accessing medically necessary hospital and physician services. 45 Up
until 1990, medical interpretation for deaf persons in the lower mainland of
British Columbia had been provided privately by a not-for-profit
organization.46 This service, however, was discontinued in September 1990
when the non-profit agency no longer had the means to financially support
it and the agency's request for government funding was denied.4 7 The
plaintiffs in this case, who were deaf and communicated through American
Sign Language, claimed that after the termination of the free medical
interpreting program their access to interpreters at hospitals was severely
hindered by financial barriers. 48 They argued that the government's failure
to step in and finance medical interpreting services amounted to a violation
of section 15 of the Charter as it deprived deaf patients of the equivalent
quality of care received by other patients.49
In a unanimous judgement in favour of the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court
characterized effective communication as "an integral part of the provision
of medical services. ' '50 It observed that "miscommunication can lead to
misdiagnosis or a failure to follow a recommended treatment," particularly
in situations of emergency. 51 The Court went on to stipulate that the non-
provision of medical interpreting services for deaf patients, in light of the
fact that other patients can communicate with their health providers free of
charge, constituted an unequal benefit of the law in a manner that violated
deaf individuals' human dignity.52 Furthermore, this infringement of deaf
persons' equality right could not be exempt by section 1 of the Charter as it
could not be considered "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society. 53 The thrust of the Court's ruling with respect to section 1 was that
offering sign language interpretation for the entirety of British Columbia
would cost only be $150,000, or approximately 0.0025 percent of the
province's health care budget at the time. 54 The complete refusal by the
government to finance medical interpreting services in such context was
seen as failing to minimally provide for the deaf persons' Charter rights.
55
To remedy this unconstitutionality, the Supreme Court gave the
government of British Columbia six months to explore its policy options
45. Eldridge, 3 S.C.R. 624, at para. 1.
46. Id at para. 3.
47. Id.
48. Id. at para. 71.
49. Id.
50. Id. at para. 69.
51. Eldridge, supra note 45, at para. 69.
52. Id. atpara. 71.
53. Charter, supra note 5, at § 1.
54. Eldridge, 3 S.C.R. 624, at para. 65.
55. Id.
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and implement the necessary changes.56 The Court held that, upon the
expiration of this grace period, it would be expected that "sign language
interpreters will be provided where necessary for effective communication
in the delivery of medical services. 57 British Columbia responded to the
court order in two phases. On April 14, 1998, shortly before the six-month
grace period was about to expire, the provincial government introduced a
24-hour toll-free line (both voice and TTY) whereby deaf patients could
request for medical interpreters in emergency situations.58 The second phase
of the government response was scheduled to take place in August of that
year where publicly-funded interpretation services for deaf patients
accessing non-emergency hospital and physician services would be
provided. 9 Publicly financed interpreters would supposedly be also
available to deaf patients' caregivers and deaf parents of hearing patients.
60
However, the medical interpreting program would not cover interpreters at
61physiotherapy, massage, dental and chiropractor appointments.
Technically, the application of the Eldridge decision could be interpreted
as limited to British Columbia since the province was the sole direct party
to the case and the Supreme Court had relied on province-specific health
care figures in justifying its findings under section 1.62 Nevertheless,
constitutional law scholars such as Kent Roach have criticized this narrow
reading of the case, arguing that "it is untenable to think that general
constitutional law issues decided by the Supreme Court of Canada must be
re-litigated on a province-by-province basis. Such an expensive and costly
approach would make remedies illusory for disadvantaged groups affected
by the Court's decisions. 63 These criticisms notwithstanding, in July 2000,
almost three years after the release of the Eldridge decision by the Supreme
Court, the government of Ontario became just the second Canadian
province to provide publicly funded sign language interpretation in health
care settings. 64 To-date, British Columbia and Ontario remain the only
56. Id. at para. 96.
57. Id. at para. 70.
58. Kent Roach, Remedial Consensus and Dialogue under the Charter: General
Declarations and Delayed Declarations of Invalidity, 35 U.B.C. L. REV. 211, 228-29 (2002);
See also Press Release, B.C. Govt., Medical Sign Language Interpreter Services Introduced
in British Columbia (Apr. 8, 1998), reprinted in MOUNTAIN EAR May 1998, at 5,
http://www.chha-nsb.com/Newsletters/ARCHIVE/SPEAK1 9.pdf.
59. Id.
60. Prince George Citizen, British Columbia: Expanded Interpretive Service for Deaf
Funded, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 12, 1998, at B1.
61. Id; See also Western Inst. for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing, Medical Interpreting
Services, http://www.widhh.com/services_medicalinterpreting.html (last visted Mar. 29,
2010).
62. See Eldridge, supra note 45, 3 S.C.R. 624.
63. Roach, supra note 58, at 230.
64. Editorial, Deaf Rights Victory Paves Way for Change, The TORONTO STAR, Sept. 16,
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provinces that have followed through with the Supreme Court's order in
Eldridge.65 It is therefore not surprising that disability groups and activists
have voiced their disappointment with the governments' implementation of
the Eldridge decision thus far. For example, the Canadian Association of
the Deaf has identified the need to enforce the Eldridge ruling across
Canada as a top advocacy issue for deaf people in relation to health care.66
David Lepofsky, a legal activist whose writing was quoted by La Forest J.
in the Eldridge judgement, observed the outcomes resulted from the case as
follows: "It was a big court breakthrough but the impact has been weak
because governments have never lived up to their obligations."
67
Even in the two provinces where free medical interpreting services are
available, there have been concerns with timely access to sign-language
interpreters. In Ontario, the health-related sign language interpretation
68programs were initially given a budget of $4.7 million per year. In
comparison to the $150,000 annual cost that the Supreme Court had
estimated for a comparable program in British Columbia,69 the amount of
funding from the Ontario government would seem to be more than
sufficient.73 However, this figure, according to the Canadian Hearing
Society, represented only half of what was actually necessary to establish
and operate an effective interpretation system in Ontario. 71 Assuming the
estimate by the Canadian Hearing Society was accurate, its significance was
arguably two-fold. On the one hand, the real cost to operate a medical sign
language interpretation program, being much more expensive than the
Supreme Court had found in Eldridge, might have contributed to the slow
uptake of the Court's order by Canadian provinces. On the other hand, an
interpretation service founded upon an overly optimistic cost estimate
would soon be proven incapable of meeting the actual needs of deaf
persons. In 2006, a Toronto Star newspaper article identified a serious lack
of sign language interpreters in Ontario, which had left deaf patients
2000, at RL02.
65. Ann Silversides, Outcome of Health Related Changes is Sometimes Surprising, CAN.
MED. Ass'N J. NEWS, Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.cmaj.ca/earlyreleases/9oct09_
legalchallenges.dtl.
66. CAN. ASS'N OF THE DEAF, DEAF ISSUES: HEALTH CARE, http://www.cad.ca/
en/issues/healthcare.asp.
67. Helen Henderson, In The Shadows No More; After 25 Years of Activism, The
Emphasis is Finally on Ability Not Disability, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 15, 2008 at Li.
68. Editorial, supra note 64.
69. Eldridge, 3 S.C.R. 624, at para. 87
70. Based on the Supreme Court of Canada's figure (i.e. $150,000 per annum, Eldridge,
3 S.C.R. 624, at para. 87) and having adjusted for population differences and inflation, the
medical sign language interpretation program should cost approximately $485,000 annually.
This is almost ten times less than the initial budget allocated by the Ontario government.
71. Editorial, supra note 64.
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vulnerable to miscommunication with health providers particularly in
72
emergency situations. The metropolitan Toronto area was reportedly hit
the hardest by the interpreter shortage.73 While there were up to 30,000 deaf
Torontonians, there were only two sign language interpreters available for
after-hour emergencies at the time.74 Exacerbating the problem was the fact
that there was only one school in the province that offered interpreter
education programs, introducing merely four new sign language interpreters
a year to the pool. 75 Similar interpreter shortage has also been experienced
in British Columbia.76 It has been reported that it may take more than two
weeks for a deaf person in the province to get an appointment with an
interpreter.77 Such inaccessibility to sign language interpreters, especially in
times of crisis, clearly runs against the spirit of the Eldridge decision which
emphasized the centrality of effective communication in the delivery of
health care.78
To our knowledge, since the advent of the Charter, there have only been
twelve cases in which the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled a state action
or some legislation unconstitutional on the ground of section 15. Of these
successful cases, Eldridge appears to be the only one that deals directly
with health resource allocation. However, the trajectory of the Eldridge case
- namely, courtroom successes in establishing positive obligations upon the
governments followed by unsatisfactory fulfilment of these obligations - is
by no means unique. For example, in Little Sisters v. Canada, the Supreme
Court of Canada found, inter alia, that Customs officials had
discriminatorily applied the obscenity law to target gay and lesbian
materials imported into the country and therefore violated section 15(1). 80
Specifically, the Court declared that Canada Customs had failed "to extend
to the [claimants] the equal benefit of fair and expeditious treatment of their
72. Anna Piekarski, DeafLack Help in Crises, TORONTO STAR, July 25, 2006, at B1.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Allison Cross, Phone Service Lures Away DeafInterpreters, VANCOUVER SUN, May
9, 2008, at B5.
77. Id.
78. Eldridge, 3 S.C.R. 624, at para. 69.
79. See MARY HURLEY, OTTAWA PARL. INFO. & RESEARCH SERV., CHARTER EQUALITY
RIGHTS: INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 15 IN SUPREME COURT OF CANADA DECISIONS 17-31
(2007). Hurley compiled a list of section 15 cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada
as of March 2007. See id. There were a total of fifty-two cases, of which twelve were
successful. A review of Supreme Court of Canada cases post-March 2007 revealed another
seven cases where alleged violations of section 15 were at issue. In all seven cases, the
section 15 claims were dismissed by the Court.
80. Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, para. 154,
2000 SCC 69 (Can.).
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imported goods without discrimination based on sexual orientation. '' s
Following the case, the federal government arguably had a positive duty to
remedy such a failure. Nonetheless, the claimants have since alleged that
while seizures of their imported materials by Customs officials had stopped
during litigation, the practice resumed no less than two weeks after the
Supreme Court decision was released, prompting them to launch another
lawsuit against the federal government. 82 As such, it is not unperceivable
that if future health rights litigation again gives rise to positive entitlement
it may once more, like Eldridge, fall into this second category of our
typology instead of the first.
The aftermath post-Eldridge serves as a sombre reminder that even a
successful juridical recognition of a positive right to health services is not in
and of itself sufficient to effect sought-after changes in practice. As seen in
Eldridge and Little Sisters, the Supreme Court of Canada's preferred
remedy in dealing with unconstitutionality appears to be a declaration of
invalidity or just a declaration of entitlement rather than an injunction that
details the exact measures required of the governments to correct the
illegality.83 While a declaratory remedy affords much flexibility to the
governments in formulating an appropriate policy response, the benefits of
which are best illustrated in the case of Chaoulli, as will be discussed later,
it also runs the risk of being taken advantage of by the governments to
circumvent the Court's rulings. 84 As mentioned, most Canadian provinces
have not developed a medical sign language interpretation program
following Eldridge. Although the implementation of such programs
understandably takes time and resources, government inactions more than
ten years after the court decision would seem to suggest that these
provinces have apparently interpreted the Eldridge ruling in its narrowest
light such that they do not believe they are bound by the Court's finding of
unconstitutionality. Even in the provinces where initial steps seem to have
been taken in response to the court order, there are doubts in the
governments' commitment to support the medical sign language interpreter
program with necessary monetary and human resources over the long run.
Legal scholars such as Kent Roach and Geoff Budlender have therefore
recommended Canadian courts to take on a greater role in supervising the
81. Id.
82. Patrick Brethour, Little Sisters Closing Book on Legal Battle, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan.
23, 2007, at S 1.
83. Roach, supra note 58, at 227.
84. See Little Sisters, 2 S.C.R. 1120, at para. 258 (lacobucci J., dissenting)
("[D]eclarations are often preferable to injunctive relief because they are more flexible,
require less supervision, and are more deferential to the other branches of government.
However, declarations can suffer from vagueness, insufficient remedial specificity, an
inability to monitor compliance, and an ensuing need for subsequent litigation to ensure
compliance.").
2010]
15
Flood and Chen: Charter Rights & Health Care Funding: A Typology of Canadian Heal
Published by LAW eCommons, 2010
Annals of Health Law
implementation of the governments' remedial measures.85 However, if it
indeed happens, such juridical development will likely take some time. At
present, it appears that the limitations of the legal system will unfortunately
be borne by the claimants since they will often need to engage in post-
litigation advocacy efforts to exert political pressure to ensure that the
governments continue to fulfil their legal obligations overtime.
C. Negative Rights in the Canadian Health Care System
In the majority of health rights litigation where Canadian health
consumers have enjoyed juridical successes, negative rights rather than
positive rights have been obtained.86 Most frequently, these lawsuits
involve the repeal of some legislative prohibition against a specific therapy
or a certain way of financing the health care system on the ground that it
violates the Charter-guaranteed right to life, liberty and security of the
person and is not justifiable under section 1.87 As such, the rights
established by health consumers in these cases are the liberty to be free
from government interference when accessing a specific health service or
resource. The effect of these negative rights on the governments' allocation
of health care dollars tends to be limited in comparison to that of positive
rights. Once the legislative ban in question is removed, these negative rights
do not further give rise to corresponding obligations upon the governments
to publicly provide the once-prohibited services. Despite this limitation, as
legal challenges of this nature are increasingly targeting the very structure
of Medicare financing - namely the prohibition against private health
insurance - with some successes, juridical finding of even a negative right
may nonetheless have significant ramifications for the Canadian public
85. See Kent Roach & Geoff Budlender, Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction:
When is It Appropriate, Just and Equitable?, 122 S. AFR. L.J. 325, 345-51 (2005). Roach and
Budlender suggest that governments may fail to comply with a court's constitutional ruling
due to inattentiveness, incompetence or intransigence. Insofar as these reasons for non-
compliance represent increasingly severe constitutional breach, they argued that courts
should issue escalating levels of remedies accordingly - ranging from general declaration to
detailed mandatory interdicts with courts retaining supervisory jurisdiction. See also Roach,
supra note 58.
86. Our review of case laws yielded a total of nineteen cases (up to August 2009) in
which the Canadian Charter was relied upon by health consumers to demand public funding
for certain therapies or to access care in a timely manner. In seven of these cases, health
consumers were successful in their Charter claims. Of them, Eldridge was the only one
where a positive entitlement to a specific health program was found. See also Ran Hirschl,
'Negative' Rights v. 'Positive' Entitlements: A Comparative Study of Judicial Interpretation
of Rights in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic Order, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 1060, 1074-76
(2000) (finding a total of 371 Charter-based cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada
between 1982 and 1999. In 131 of these cases, Charter rights were successfully invoked,
consisting of 117 negative rights claims and fourteen involving positive and collective
rights).
87. See Charter, supra note 5, at § 1.
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health care system.
i. Access to Treatment and Therapy
The case of R. v. Morgentaler, where the constitutionality of the criminal
ban on abortion was under challenge, is an example of health consumers
successfully asserting a right to access a particular medical service without
state interference. 88 Section 251 of the Criminal Code at the time prohibited
all abortions unless it was found by the therapeutic abortion committee of
an approved hospital that the continuation of pregnancy would endanger the
woman's life or health.89 This criminal provision was struck down by the
Supreme Court for having unjustifiably contravened women's right to
security of the person as protected under section 7 of the Charter.9 ° Chief
Justice Dickson held that the impugned provision not only threatened
women's physical integrity by removing from them the power of deciding
whether to undergo therapeutic abortions but also imposed serious
psychological stress upon women. 91 Furthermore, in his opinion, the
approval process stipulated in the Criminal Code caused unnecessary delays
for women who were legally entitled to abortion services and consequently
undermined these women's wellbeing.92 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Beetz went further to contend that the Charter protection over one's
security of the person "must include a right of access to medical treatment
for a condition representing a danger to life or health, without fear of
criminal sanction., 93 Wilson J., who also ruled in favour of revoking the
criminal ban on abortion, arguably took the broadest view. 94 She argued that
the criminal law provision in question not only violated womens' right to
security of the person but also their right to liberty.95 She opined that "[t]he
right to 'liberty' contained in s. 7 guarantees to every individual a degree of
personal autonomy over important decisions intimately affecting his or her
private life."96 Womens' decision over whether to terminate a pregnancy,
because of its notable psychological, economic and social consequences,
falls under this protected category.
97
Although neither Beetz J.'s interpretation of the right to security of the
person nor Wilson J.'s understanding of the right to liberty represented the
88. Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. 30, at para. 38.
89. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, ch. C-34, § 251.
90. Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. 30, at para. 32.
91. Id. at para. 32.
92. Id. at para. 36.
93. Id. at para. 34 (Beetz J., concurring).
94. Id. at para. 36 (Wilson J., concurring).
95. Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. 30 at para. 36-37.
96. Id.
97. Id. at para. 37.
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majority opinion in Morgentaler, they nonetheless forewarned the
governments to exercise extra caution when utilizing criminal law in a non-
nuanced manner to deal with complex health care issues. 98 Subsequently,
there have been a number of cases in which courts repealed criminal law
provisions that indiscriminately barred the access to certain therapies from
all Canadians regardless of any special circumstances. As a case in point, in
R v. Parker, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the complete prohibition
against possession of marihuana intruded upon the right to liberty and
security of the person of those who genuinely required the substance for
medicinal purposes, and such intrusion was not in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice or the justified limitations in a free and
democratic society. 99 In reaching its decision, the Ontario court adopted the
views of both Beetz and Wilson JJ. on the scope of section 7 rights.100
Similarly, in PHS Community Services Society v. Canada, the British
Columbia Supreme Court invalidated Canada's absolute and unqualified
ban on possession and trafficking of controlled substances on the ground
that it violated the section 7 rights of injection drug users who were in need
of harm reduction therapy. 10 1
Initially, these legal successes seemed to have prompted the kind of
policy changes sought by activists. Subsequent to the decision of
Morgentaler, except for an unsuccessful attempt that was defeated by the
Senate in 1991, there have been no legislative actions at the federal level to
recriminalize abortion. 10 2 Since 1995, abortion has been recognized by the
federal government as a medically necessary service and should be publicly
funded by the provinces pursuant to the Canada Health Act.' °3 As for
medicinal marihuana, the government of Canada decided not to appeal the
appellate court's ruling in Parker.'04 It introduced the Marihuana Medical
Access Regulations ("MMAR") 10 5 in summer 2001. Under these regulations,
individuals suffering from debilitating symptoms associated with medical
98. Id. at para. 36, 38.
99. See R v. Parker, [2000] 49 O.R. (3d) 481, para. 190 (Can.).
100. Id. at para. 93. In the criminal law context "liberty includes the right to make
decisions of fundamental personal importance" and, therefore, "deprivation by means of a
criminal sanction of access to medication reasonably required for the treatment of a medical
condition that threatens life or health constitutes deprivation of security of the person." Id. at
paras. 92, 97.
101. PHS Cmty. Servs. Soc'y v. Can. (Attorney General), 2008 BCSC 661, paras. 152-
53, 158 (Can.).
102. Sanda Rodgers, Abortion Denied: Bearing the Limits of Law, in COLLEEN FLOOD,
JUST MEDICARE: WHAT'S IN, WHAT'S OUT, How WE DECIDE 107, 110-11 (2006).
103. Id. at 115.
104. CAN. AIDS SOC'Y, CANNABIS AS THERAPY FOR PEOPLE LIVrNG WITH HIV-AIDS:
"OUR RIGHT, OUR CHOICE", 20 (2006).
105. Marihuana Medical Access Regulations, S.O.R./2001-227 (Can.) [hereinafter
MMAR].
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conditions such as multiple sclerosis, spinal cord injury/disease, cancer,
HIV/AIDS, severe arthritis, and epilepsy are now eligible to possess and
grow marihuana for personal use. 10 6 Lastly, as a result of the PHS case,
Canada's only legal supervised injection site located in Vancouver (i.e.
Insite) - which has been operating since 2003 on the basis of a special
exemption under section 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Acto 7
- is allowed to continue its service provision after June 30, 2008, the date
that its exemption was due to expire. 10 8 Whether PHS will stand as an
affirmation of patients' rights under section 7 remains to be seen. The
federal government recently lost an appeal of PHS, but in the process the
ratio of the case has changed, with section 7 issues falling into the
background.109 The British Columbia Court of Appeal relied on a division
of powers analysis, ruling that the provincial government had authority to
create safe injection sites, under its jurisdiction over health care. Citing the
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, the Court ruled that the federal
government could not use its criminal law powers to thwart the province's
strategy for improving the health of intravenous drug addicts. At the time of
writing, the federal government is deciding whether to appeal the
decision.110
Notwithstanding such preliminary successes, however, access to
therapies like abortion, medical marihuana, and safe injection programs has
by and large remained difficult in Canada following decriminalization. In
fact, with respect to abortion, there have been reports suggesting that
accessibility of services actually declined after the Morgentaler decision. In
1986, two years before Morgentaler, there were a total of 643 hospitals in
Canada with obstetrics capacity, of which 225 (i.e. 35%) provided
therapeutic abortions."' In contrast, in 2003, a study conducted by the
Canadian Abortion Rights Action League found that only 123 of Canada's
692 hospitals (i.e. 17.8%) offered abortion services."l 2 The percentage of
106. See id
107. Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 1996 S.C., ch. 19, § 56 (Can.) ("The
Minister may, on such terms and conditions as the Minister deems necessary, exempt any
person or class of persons ... from the application of all or any of the provisions of this Act
or the regulations if, in the opinion of the Minister, the exemption is necessary for a medical
or scientific purpose or is otherwise in the public interest.").
108. Rod Mickleburgh, Safe-Injection Clinic Wins Legal Reprieve, GLOBE & MAIL, May
28, 2008, at A9.
109. PHS Cmty. Servs. Soc'y v. Can. (Attorney General), 2010 BCCA 14, para. 177
(Can.).
110. Ian Bailey, Injection Court Can Stay Open, B.C. Court Rules, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan.
15, 2010, at Al.
111. RAYMOND TATALOVICH, THE POLITICS OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 211 (1997).
112. CANADIAN ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE (CARAL), PROTECTING ABORTION
RIGHTS IN CANADA 13 (2003). According to the Canadian Abortion Rights Action League,
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Canadian hospitals with abortion services further decreased to 15.9% in
2006.113 Particularly, as of 2008, there remained no hospitals or clinics in
Prince Edward Island (P.E.I) that would perform abortion. 14 Women from
P.E.I. who require therapeutic abortions must therefore obtain such
procedures out-of-province and subsequently seek reimbursement from the
public health insurance plan. 
15
Even at hospitals where abortion services are supposedly available,
access is sometimes restricted to those having received physician
referrals 16 and those who are within the gestational limits." 7 Furthermore,
according to Canadians for Choice, when women try to contact these
hospitals to enquire about therapeutic abortions, they often encounter staff
members who are unaware of the availability of such services or unwilling
to provide the requested information. Unsolicited anti-choice counselling,
which at times has referred to myths and inaccuracies about abortion, or
referral to anti-choice organizations is also common. 18 As such, many
women end up having to travel outside of their areas of residence to find a
medical facility that is able and willing to perform abortions, thus incurring
significant travel and accommodation expenses. In addition, in some
provinces like New Brunswick, where abortions performed at clinics are not
publicly funded, women who cannot access abortions at hospitals are left to
the reasons behind the decreasing number of abortion providers are multi-fold. To a certain
extent, the decline can be explained by the fact that since Morgentaler abolished the legally
required therapeutic abortion committees in hospitals, there is no longer an obligation for
hospitals to have at least one trained abortion doctor on staff. Also contributing to the decline
is the trend to amalgamate religious and secular hospitals, which has left publicly-funded
Catholic institutions as the sole provider of reproductive health services in many
communities across Canada. In many cases, these Catholic hospitals do not provide abortion
services. For example, it was observed that of 127 hospital mergers that took place between
1990 and 1998, half led to the elimination of at least some, if not all, reproductive health
services that had previously been available.
113. JESSICA SHAW, CANADIANS FOR CHOICE, REALITY CHECK: A CLOSE LOOK AT
ACCESSING ABORTION SERVICES IN CANADIAN HOSPITALS 15 (2006).
114. Abortion Information Line Disconnected, CBS NEWS, Jan. 29, 2008,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/prince-edward-island/story/2008/01/29/abortion-line.html.
115. Tatalovich, supra note 111, at 32 (a woman who wishes to have her abortion
publicly funded must first receive approval from a Prince Edward Island doctor who deems
such procedure as medically necessary, and subsequently have the doctor submit a request
for funding to the province's Department of Health and Social Services).
116. Sanda Rodgers, Women's Reproductive Equality and the Supreme Court of
Canada, in HEALTH LAW AT THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 189, 214 (Jocelyn Downie &
Elaine Gibson eds., 2006) (noting that in New Brunswick, for instance, the referrals of two
physicians are required to access abortion services).
117. Tatalovich, supra note 111, at 15. A national survey of hospitals found that, among
those responded, 1 would only perform abortions up to 10 weeks of gestation, 9 would do so
up to 12 weeks, 3 up to 13 weeks, 6 up to 14 weeks, 1 up to 15 weeks, 3 up to 16 weeks, 1
up to 18 weeks and 2 up to 20 weeks. Id.
118. Ibid., at 42-44.
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pay for their procedures, ranging between $500 and $750, out of pocket."l 9
This financial burden poses a particular access barrier to women from
marginalized communities, including youth, those who are poor, and those
who live in rural and northern areas.
The situation of access to medicinal marihuana under the MMAR tells a
similar tale. It is frequently reported that there are approximately 400,000
Canadians who utilize marihuana for therapeutic reasons. 120 However, by
June 2006, there were less than 1,400 people who were legally permitted to
possess marihuana under the MMAR.121 This figure only rose to fewer than
2,400 people in February 2008.122 Many of the factors that have contributed
to this low participation rate mirror the access barriers mentioned in regards
to abortion. Whereas some women seeking therapeutic abortions are
uninformed of where and how to access services and are sometimes given
false information by hospital staffs, some individuals who meet the
eligibility criteria under the MMAR are unaware of or are misinformed
about the federal medical marihuana program.' 23 Others are unwilling or
unable to undergo the application and yearly renewal processes that are
perceived as overly complex; applicants must not only complete the
necessary forms, obtain passport-type photographs and gather the required
signatures from a physician, but also cover the costs thereof.124 Just as the
requirement of physician referrals in the abortion setting sometimes left
women in peril of being denied services by doctors with anti-choice beliefs,
the need to attain physician declaration and signatures under the MMAR has
in some cases impeded patients' access to medicinal marihuana because of
unsupportive doctors. 125
Even for people who have successfully registered in the federal medical
marihuana program, there have been significant barriers concerning access
to marihuana from licit sources. Pursuant to the MMAR, authorized
individuals may obtain marihuana by purchasing it from the government, by
attaining seeds from Health Canada and growing their own crops, or by
designating a person to grow for them. 126 However, only less than 1 in 5
authorized users in Canada have chosen to acquire their marihuana from the
119. Ibid., at 24.
120. CAN. AIDS Soc'Y, supra note 10404, at 1.
121. Ibid.
122. Brian Preston, Eight Years of Reefer Madness; Why Can't Ottawa Deliver a
Sensible, Humane Medicinal-Marijuana Program? NAT'L POST, Feb. 27, 2008, at A18. In
comparison, in Oregon - with a population one-tenth of that of Canada - there were 15,000
individuals registered in its medical marihuana program. Id.
123. See CARAL, supra note 12012.
124. Ibid, at 33.
125. Ibid, at 34-35.
126. MMAR, supra note 105, at § 70.
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government as some users have questioned the quality and potency of state-
provided marihuana. 27 Given the compromised health status of many of
these authorized users, the number of people who elect to cultivate their
own marihuana has also remained low. 128 While it is possible for patients to
designate another person to grow marihuana for them, up until May 2009
the MMAR prohibited each designated grower to produce marihuana for
more than one authorized user,129 thus largely eliminating the financial
incentive for anyone wishing to become a licensed grower. 130 Consequently,
many medical marihuana users are forced to access their marihuana through
the black market, often from questionable suppliers and at high prices.
13
'
Access for intravenous drug users in Canada to harm reduction programs
post-PHS does not fare much better, either. Although the court order
secured the legal basis for Insite to remain open in the short-term, as the
federal government has decided to appeal the decision,'32 the site's long-
term viability remains uncertain. Further, given that Insite has been
operating at its full capacity, 133 some advocates had hoped that the PHS
case would encourage similar safe injection facilities to be established
elsewhere in Canada. Despite some initial interest expressed immediately
after the release of the PHS decision, in August 2008 the Quebec
government announced that it would not proceed with opening a safe
injection site in Montreal at this time. 34 As such, Insite remains the only
legal supervised injection facility in Canada.
These issues of access illustrate the limitations of health rights litigation
that only brings about negative rights. Sanda Rodgers, who has written
extensively about the access barriers to abortion services post-Morgentaler,
127. Sfetkopoulos v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] 3 F.C.R. 399, para. 19 (Can.).
[Sfetkopoulos].
128. Hitzig v. R., [ 003] 231 D.L.R. (4th) 104, para. 40 (Can.).
129. Tim Naumetz, Cabinet Tweaks Medical Marijuana Rules After Losing Court Case,
CAN. PRESS, May 26, 2009, available at http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/090525/health/
health marijuana cabinet (discussing the increase the number of medical marihuana users to
whom each licensed grower can supply from one to two.).
130. Hitzig, 231 D.L.R. (4th) 104, at para. 70.
131. Id. at para. 22.
132. "Ottawa in Court bid to Shut Safe Injection Site ", THE CANADIAN. PRESS, (Apr. 27,
2009),
http://www.ctvbc.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20090427/BC-insite-court-lawyers-090
427/ 20090427/?hub=BritishColumbiaHome.
133. Amy Husser & Meagan Fitzpatrick, Tories to Appeal Insite Decision; Ottawa to
Fight Court Ruling that Allows for Injection-Drug Users to Stay Open, VANCOUVER SUN,
May 30, 2008, at BI ("The site's advocates point out that it is operating at full capacity, with
up to 800 people using it every day."). See also PHS Cmty. Servs. Soc'y v. Can. (Attorney
General), 2008 BCSC 661, para. 85 (noting that there have been more than 8000 individuals
that accessed Insite since its inception and the facility operated near capacity).
134. Aaron Derfel, "We want safe injection sites here: coalition; Health minister urged
to reconsider policy" The [Montreal] Gazette (Aug. 23, 2008) A6.
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observed:
"[T]he reasoning in Morgentaler suggests the actual limits of its impact, as well
as the increasingly narrow legal topography of the cases that follow .... There is
no suggestion of any state obligation to provide women with appropriate and
timely access to means by which they can control their reproduction so as to
enhance their equality. There is no constitutional impediment to state interference
with women's bodily security so long as the state involvement is properly
procedural. Current impediments to abortion continue to track exactly these fault
lines."1
That is, at the very least, a pronouncement of a negative right means that
the governments are free to take a laissez-faire approach in regards to the
development and administration of the health services in question,
notwithstanding aforementioned decreasing number of service providers,
financial and administrative barriers and in some cases unsupportive care
professionals. Aside from removing the unconstitutional criminal sanctions,
the governments are not under a legal obligation to actively ensure the
accessibility of therapies such as abortion, medical marihuana and harm
reduction programs.
Moreover, successful establishment of a negative right does not prevent
the governments from restricting service access altogether. As these cases
are concerned with specific legislative provisions, it is possible for the
governments to introduce new laws to replace those struck down by courts.
If problems arise with respect to the constitutionality of these new pieces of
legislation, it will be again up to health consumers to bring their concerns to
courts, thus disadvantaging those who do not have the time or financial
resources to do so. For instance, after section 251 of the Criminal Code was
revoked by the Morgentaler ruling, many provinces sought to re-establish
restrictions to abortion services by introducing their own laws and
regulations, which in turn sparked a series of legal challenges across
Canada.1 36 While many of these provincial legislations were successfully
repealed by courts, some of these cases were not resolved until having
reached the Supreme Court of Canada years later. 37 Even more frustrating
135. Rodgers, supra note 116 at 206-207.
136. See e.g. British Columbia B.C. Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. British
Columbia B.C. (A.G.) (1998), B.C.L.R. (2d) 189 (under challenge was British Columbia
Regulation 54/88, which excluded abortion as a medically necessary and therefore public-
funded service except when it was performed in a hospital and when there was a significant
threat to the mother's life); Lexogest Inc. v. Manitoba (A.G.) (1993), 85 Man.R. (2d) 8 (a
Manitoba regulation that refused funding for costs of abortions unless they were performed
at hospitals was under challenge).
137. See R v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 (the Nova Scotia Medical Services Act,
which outlawed privatization of certain therapeutic procedures including abortion, was found
in violation of the federal government's criminal law jurisdiction and therefore
unconstitutional); Morgentaler v. New Brunswick (A.G.) (1995), 156 N.B.R. (2d) 205 leave
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to health consumers was arguably the failed attempt to overturn Prince
Edward Island's Health Services Payment Act Regulations, which limit the
province's insurance coverage of abortions to only those performed at
hospitals and deemed by the provincial Health and Community Service
Agency to be medically necessary, effectively recreating the
unconstitutional approval scheme under section 251 of the Criminal Code
for those unable to pay out of pocket.
138
The policy development in regards to medical marihuana post-Parker
tracks a similar trajectory. As mentioned, patients registered in the medical
marihuana program consistently face difficulties accessing marihuana from
legal sources, partly because of the restriction under the MMAR that each
designated grower could only provide marihuana to one authorized user.
After the medical marihuana users successfully challenged the
constitutionality of such restriction for having arbitrarily violated their
rights to liberty and security of the person, 139 Health Canada responded in
May 2009 by announcing that it would increase the number of users to
whom each licensed grower can supply from one to two. 140 This policy
change has drawn criticism from medical marihuana advocates as it is
unlikely to create the necessary financial incentive for would-be growers
and thereby increase the licit supply of marihuana. For this reason, some
have predicted that the new regulation will eventually be repealed by courts
as well. 14' However, as this dialogue between the judiciary and the federal
government drags on, patients who are in need of marihuana as medication
will unfortunately continue to bear the risks associated with obtaining
marihuana on the black market.
While the experiences subsequent to Morgentaler, Parker and PHS
expose the limitations of negative legal rights in furthering health
to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 24623 (August 17, 1995) (provisions in New Brunswick's
Medical Act that considered performing abortions outside of hospitals a form of professional
misconduct were found ultra vires the provincial heads of power).
138. Morgentaler v. Prince Edward Island (Minister of Health and Social Services)
(1996), 144 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 263 (P.E.I.S.C. (A.D.)). The sole issue in this case was whether
the provincial Health Services Payment Act authorized the P.E.I. Health and Community
Services Agency to make a regulation that would effectively deny public payment for
therapeutic abortions unless such procedures are performed in hospitals and deemed
medically required; the Court of Appeal answered this question affirmatively. Because this
case does not involve a constitutional challenge, it is important to note that it neither
overturn Morgentaler [1988] nor recreate the criminal prohibition scheme. That said, this
decision does make legal abortions practically inaccessible to women who cannot afford to
pay privately unless their requests to undergo therapeutic abortions are considered medically
necessary and the procedures are performed at hospitals.
139. Morgentaler, supra note 88, Sfetkopoulos, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 32944
(April 23, 2009).
140. See id
141. Ibid.
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consumers' access to certain therapies and treatments, in the following
section, we consider the potential ramifications of the same type of health
rights litigation - namely, the successful revocation of particular legislative
prohibition - when it is directed at the fiscal foundation of Canadian
Medicare.
ii. Access to Private Health Insurance
Since its inception, the Canadian health care system as we now know has
provided public financing for medically necessary hospital and physician
services on a first-dollar basis. 142 This coverage structure has largely been
supported on two grounds: first, access to health care should be on the basis
of need instead of ability to pay, and second, a flourishing private tier will
draw resources away from the public health care system and threaten its
long-term sustainability. 143 Over the years, provinces have employed a
myriad of legislative schemes to curtail the development of a parallel
private health care sector, ranging from direct prohibition of private
insurance for publicly covered services to provisions that eliminate
financial incentives for physicians to opt out of the public plan. 144
In Chaoulli,145 the validity of Quebec's ban on private health insurance
was challenged by Dr. Chaoulli and Mr. Zeliotis - the former was a
physician who had unsuccessfully applied for a license to open an
independent private hospital in the province whereas the latter was a
Quebecker who had suffered from numerous health conditions and
encountered difficulties accessing timely care in the public health care
system. They alleged that the provincial laws in question were in breach of
patients' rights as guaranteed under section 1 of Quebec's Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms146 and under section 7 of the Canadian
Charter. In a 4-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners
and repudiated the prohibition of private insurance on the basis of the
Quebec Charter. Justice Deschamps, penning for the majority, ruled that in
142. Canada Health Act, supra note 1, ss. 18 and 19 (These two sections of the CHA
require provincial insurance plans to outlaw, respectively, extra-billing and user charges in
order to qualify for federal funding. Consequently, physicians are neither allowed to bill
patients for some or all of the health care costs, nor permitted to charge patients fees that
exceed what are payable by the provincial governments for the medical services in
question.).
143. See e.g. Chaoulli, supra note 7, paras. 49-50 (Deschamps J. described the
objectives of the Quebec legislation barring private health insurance as to ensure equality of
access and to safeguard the quality of care provided by the public system).
144. Colleen M. Flood & Tom Archibald, "The Illegality of Private Health Care in
Canada" (2001) 164 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 825.
145. See Manfredi & Maioni, supra note 9.
146. Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12, s. 1 ("Every human being
has a right to life, and to personal security, inviolability and freedom.") [Quebec Charter].
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the context of long wait lists, some patients who could have otherwise
obtained timely services through private insurance unfortunately died, while
many others suffered from pain and suffering before they would receive
treatments in the public system. As such, the impugned laws were held to
have contravened health consumers' right to life and personal inviolability.
In other words, the decision afforded Quebeckers a negative right to be free
from government interference when purchasing private health insurance.
Furthermore, three of the four majority judges in Chaoulli, whose
opinion was written by McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J., also found the
legislative prohibition in question to have infringed upon the Canadian
Charter. In addition to the right to life, they held that the right to security of
the person under section 7 of the Charter was engaged in this case as delays
in treatment could result in clinically significant detriments to patients'
health. The justices went on to embark on a crude international comparison
of health systems and concluded that the presence of a parallel private
sector would not necessarily undermine the quality of the public health care
regime. 147 The intrusion upon patients' right to life and security of the
person by Quebec's private health insurance ban was therefore found
arbitrary and not in keeping with the principles of fundamental justice or
the reasonable limits allowed under section 1 of the Charter. As Justice
Deschamps decided not to rule on this aspect of the case, the Supreme
Court was ultimately split over the constitutionality of the prohibition
against private health insurance.
The advent of Chaoulli has added fuel to the intense debate over the role
of the private sector in Canadian Medicare. Immediately upon the release of
the Supreme Court decision, opinion leaders on both sides of the
ideological divide utilized the print media as an avenue to weigh in on the
ruling and to predict, and hopefully influence, future health policy
developments.1 48 Those who saw privatization as a solution to the ills of the
Canadian health care system praised the decision for having taken the first
step towards necessary reform.1 49 Supporters of the public system, on the
other hand, feared that the Chaoulli case would lead to a full-fledged two-
147. For a thorough discussion on the flaws of the Supreme Court's international
comparative exercise, see Colleen Flood, "Chaoulli: Political Undertows and Judicial
Riptides" (2008) Special Edition Health L. J. 211.
148. Amelie Quesnel-Vallee et al., "In the Aftermath of Chaoulli v. Quebec: Whose
Opinion Prevailed?" (2006) 175 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1051 (there were a total of 290 opinion
editorials published in the Canadian print media during the first six months since the release
of Chaoulli, with those for and those against private health insurance almost evenly divided).
149. See e.g. Kazi Stastna & Irwin Block, "Champions of private health care take pride
in ruling" The Ottawa Citizen (10 June, 2005) A3; Charlie Fidelman, "Supreme Court opens
door to two-tier health system; 'Gutsy' judgement will spur reform, proponents of private
care predict" The [Montreal] Gazette (10 June, 2005), Al; Jason Markusoff, "'Alberta
government very pleased with this decision' Edmonton Journal (19 June, 2005) A3.
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tier regime where access to services would be improved for the privileged
few on the back of the majority of Canadians. 150 However, almost everyone
seemed to agree that the Chaoulli judgement would have a transformative
effect on the Canadian health care landscape. 1
51
In our opinion, the greatest impact that has resulted from the Chaoulli
decision to-date is the transformation of the two-tier system from a largely
discounted proposition into a legitimate policy option for Canadian health
care reform. The waning support for the public regime among physicians as
reflected by the policy directives of the Canadian Medical Association
(CMA) post-Chaoulli is a telling case in point. As recent as in 2004 when
the CMA sought to intervene in the Chaoulli case, then President-Elect of
the organization, Dr. Albert Schumacher, was quoted as stating that the
CMA had "a special interest and concern in ensuring that patients have
timely access to quality health care within a well-funded public health care
system.' 152 No sooner than two months after the release of the Supreme
Court ruling in 2005, however, the majority of delegates at the annual CMA
meeting endorsed a motion that supported private health care and private
health insurance for patients who could not access timely treatment in the
public regime. 5 3 At the CMA meeting the following year, the delegates
again passed a number of resolutions concerning what it termed the "public-
private interface," including a call for the repeal of provincial legislations
that bar physicians from practicing in both the private and public sectors. 154
This prohibition of double dipping has been part and parcel of provinces'
regulatory scheme to prevent a flourishing private health care system. At
the same time, a motion for the CMA to "[u]rge governments to recognize
that parallel private health insurance for medically necessary physician and
150. See e.g. Sam Shortt, "Ruling won't improve health care" The Ottawa Citizen (15
June, 2005), A15; Scott Sinclair, "Opening the gate for a Trojan horse" The Toronto Star (30
June, 2005), A31; Lawrie McFarlane,
"Commentary: Supreme Court Slaps For-Sale Sign on Medicare" (2005) 173 Can. Med.
Assoc. J. 269.
151. See e.g. Cristin Schmitz, "Court ruling will likely spark legal challenges: 'It
fundamentally reshapes the landscape"' Calgary Herald (10 June, 2005) A6; Mark Kennedy,
"Historic health ruling: Decision will transform Canada's health system" [Saskatoon] Star-
Phoenix (10 June, 2005) Al; "Editorial: Private Medical Care Comes to Canada," (2005)
173 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 225.
152. Patrick Sullivan, "CMA granted right to intervene in key Supreme Court case"
Health Care News (Jan. 26, 2004), Canadian Medical Association, http://www.cma.ca/
index.cfm?ciid=4592&la id=l>.
153. Barbara Sibbald, "CMA okays private health care for waiting patients" (2005) 173
Can. Med. Assoc. J. 585.
154. Barbara Sibbald, "CMA's direction on the public-private interface" (2006) 175
Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1047 [CMA Direction]. In 2007, the CMA released a vision paper that
reaffirmed the call to remove the ban on double dipping. See CMA, It's Still About Access!
Medicare Plus: CMA Policy Statement (Ottawa: Canadian Medical Association, 2007).
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hospital services is inconsistent with the principle that access to medical
care must be based on need and not ability to pay" was rejected.155
In spite of such legitimization that private financing now enjoys in
Canadian health policy discourse, so far the actual impact of Chaoulli on
Medicare has been rather limited in comparison to the transformative
potential of the case that many anticipated. 15 6 As Chaoulli was decided on
the basis of the Quebec Charter, its application does not extend beyond the
province of Quebec. Similar prohibition of private health insurance in other
provinces remains in force. Even within Quebec, the negative and
contextualized nature of the right established in this case has provided the
provincial government some room for policy manoeuvre. In the immediate
aftermath of Chaoulli, the Quebec government had initially contemplated
overturning not only its ban on private insurance but also its prohibition
against the practice of double dipping even though the Supreme Court
ruling did not actually require it to do so. Significant lobbying and efforts
on the part of health law and health policy scholars eventually helped
persuade the Quebec government to abandon this plan. 157 As the court
decision is specific to the private health insurance ban, once the provision
concerned is repealed, the Quebec government does not have a legal
obligation to proactively overturn other laws likewise designed to
discourage the flourishing of a private health care sector. In fact, since the
finding of the Quebec Charter breach in this instance is hinged upon the
context of long wait lists in the public system, the government could have
even kept the prohibition of private health insurance intact so long as the
problem of long wait times is properly addressed. Taking advantages of
these facts, the Quebec government's formal response to the Chaoulli
decision arguably demonstrates a balanced approach.'58 In 2006, the
Quebec legislature passed Bill 33: An Act to Amend the Act respecting
health services and social services and other legislative provisions,159
155. CMA Direction, ibid
156. See e.g. Douglas Thomson & Dennis Jeanes, "Info - One Year after Chaoulli -
Uncertainty and Clinical Gridlock", online: (2007) 73 Can. Orthopaedic Assoc. Bull. 4
<http://www.coa-aco.org/coa-bulletin/issue-73/> ("Quebec's formal response, in terms of an
expected huge increase in private services, hasn't come to pass and isn't likely to in the near
future.").
157. TATALOVICH, supra note 111, at 222.
158. For a more detailed discussion on Quebec's response to the Chaoulli decision, see
Colleen M. Flood & Sujith Xavier, "Health Care Rights in Canada: The Chaoulli Legacy" in
Andre den Exter, ed., International Health Law: Solidarity and Justice in Health Care
Access (Portland, Oregon: Maklu, 2008). See also Marie-Claude Premont, "Clearing the Path
for Private Health Markets in Post-Chaoulli Quebec" (2008) Special Edition Health L. J.
237.
159. Bill 33, An Act to amend the Act respecting health services and social services and
other legislative provisions, 2nd Sess., 37th Leg., Quebec, 2006 (assented to 13 December
2006), S.Q. 2006, c. 43.
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which provides for a range of measures to facilitate the fulfilment of wait
time targets in the public system.1 60 At the same time, Bill 33 liberalizes the
complete ban on private health insurance to allow the sale and purchase of
insurance for hip, knee and cataract surgeries. 6'1 However, if the Quebec
government delivers on its promise of a shorter wait time for these
procedures, 162 the public's demand for private insurance coverage in these
three areas will likely be insignificant. Why buy private health insurance if
timely treatment is assured in the public health care system? 163 Did I not
read something recently about Quebec revisiting this restrained approach to
private insurance?
As already seen in the contexts of abortion and medical marihuana, the
negative nature of the rights rendered by courts not only has implications
for governments' subsequent policy development, but it may also affect the
extent that health consumers have access to the services sought after. The
Chaoulli decision does not require that the Quebec government ensures
consumers' access to private health insurance. As private insurers
commonly prorate their premiums according to the perceived risks of the
insured, those with the most immediate need for health insurance such as
the elderly and the chronically ill will likely face the greatest financial
barriers to acquiring coverage. In fact, individuals whose risks are
considered to be too high are often excluded from private health insurance
coverage all together. A survey conducted in 2005 found that 58% of
Canadian doctors believed that their patients would either not qualify for or
160. See e.g. ibid, ss. 7, 8, 17(1). Sections 7 and 8 of Bill 33 create a centralized
mechanism for the management of wait lists by hospitals for specialized and super-
specialized services. The Director of Professional Services is responsible for ensuring that
each clinical department manages its wait times accordingly. If there are long wait times for
specific specialized medical services in a region, s. 17(1) of the Act empowers the Health
Minister to take measures to implement alternative procedures to alleviate the strain and
ensure reasonable standards are maintained. See also Marie-Claude Premont, "Crunch time
for public health care in Quebec" The Toronto Star (17 November 2006) A2 1.
161. Ibid., s. 42.
162. In a discussion paper published in the wake of Chaoulli and before the enactment
of Bill 33, the Quebec government sets out a wait time guarantee of 6 months for hip, knee
and cataract surgeries. The same document also provides that if a patient waits for more than
6 months, the government will pay for treatment in a private clinic. If the wait exceeds 9
months, then the patient may receive care out-of-province at public expense. See Ministre
de la Sant6 et des Services Sociaux (Quebec), Guaranteeing Access: Meeting the Challenges
of Equity, Efficiency and Quality (Quebec City: Government of Quebec).
163. "No one wants Quebec's limited private health insurance: Province OK'd private
insurance to speed up knee, hip and cataract surgery" CBC News (30 March 2009), online:
CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montrealstory/ 2009/03/30/mtl-health-insurance-
interest-0330.html>. But see Marie-Claude Premont, supra note 158. Premont took a more
critical view on the wait time guarantees adopted by the Quebec government, arguing that it
effectively serves as a mechanism that pumps public health dollars to the private market.
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be unable to afford private health insurance even if it were available. 164
Ironically, at sixty-five years of age and with pre-existing heart and hip
conditions, Mr. Zeliotis, the patient at the centre of the Chaoulli case,
would have likely been one of those left uninsured by the private health
insurers notwithstanding his legal success. 1
65
Having observed Chaoulli's relatively contained impact to-date, it
behoves us to caution supporters of the public health care system against
breathing a premature sigh of relief as the Chaoulli's legacy for Medicare
may not yet have played out in its entirety. In the wake of the Chaoulli
success, proponents of private medicine have launched lawsuits of similar
nature across Canada. In Alberta, Mr. William Murray is presently seeking
certification of a class action against the province for the damages he
allegedly sustained from being denied access to a special form of hip
replacement procedure by the public health insurance plan. He argues, inter
alia, that the denial of public coverage in conjunction with sections of the
Alberta Health Care Insurance Act' 66 that effectively prevent treatment
access outside of the government-run regime violates his rights under
section 7 of the Charter.'67 In Ontario, an ongoing case initiated by Mr.
Lindsay McCreith and Shona Holmes points to the wait time problems in
the province and calls into question the constitutionality of provincial
regulations that are designed to suppress the expansion of the private health
care sector. 168 The constitutional validity of similar provisions under British
Columbia's Medicare Protection Act' 69 is also being contested by the
Canadian Independent Medical Clinic Association along with five private
surgery clinics in that province represented by Dr. Brian Day, a past
president of the CMA. 170 Unlike Chaoulli, however, this second wave of
cases are challenging not only laws prohibiting private health insurance but
also other laws working in conjunction therewith to curtail the development
of a thriving private health care sector. 7 1 From this perspective, if
164. Barbara Sibbald, "Questions Raised about Private Insurance" (2005) 173 Can.
Med. Assoc. J. 585.
165. Colleen M. Flood, "Chaoulli's Legacy for the Future of Canadian Health Care
Policy" (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L. J. 273 at 309.
166. Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-20.
167. Murray v. Alberta (Minister of Health) (2007), 76 Alta. L.R. (4th) 118, headnote,
para. 2. See also Tatalovich, supra note 111, at 224-225.
168. Lindsay McCreith and Shona Holmes and the Attorney General for the Province of
Ontario (Statement of Claim filed at Ontario Superior Court of Justice 5 September 2007)
(McCreith statement of claim]. See also Tatalovich supra note 111, at 226-229.
169. Medicare Protection Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 286.
170. Megan Stewart, "Clinics take legal action in fight for private health care" GLOBE &
MAIL (29 January, 2009) S 1.
171. For example, in addition to Ontario's prohibition of private health insurance,
McCreith and Holmes are challenging the ban on direct billing (i.e. the practice where health
practitioner bills patients directly for the services provided instead of billing the provincial
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successful, the implication of these cases for the Canadian health care
system could be much greater than that of Chaoulli.
In sum, our discussions about health rights litigation that succeeds in
establishing a negative right - whether with respect to a certain therapeutic
procedure or to private health care financing - track a pattern of access
difficulties to the services in question following judicial proceedings. To a
large extent, such access barriers could be attributed to the fact that a
finding of a negative right simply repeals an impugned legislation, thus
allowing the governments to leave intact other existing restrictions on the
health services or to introduce new policy constraints. A negative right also
does not legally compel the governments to take steps to ensure accessible
services. When left unchecked, unfortunately, these limitations of the law
are frequently borne by the most marginalized individuals in society.
However, our discussions are not intended to trivialize the accomplishments
that have indeed been, or could potentially be, achieved by health
consumers through this type of health rights litigation. In fact, as we have
stressed, successful Charter challenges against laws that hinder the growth
of a private health care sector may have a great impact upon the future of
Canadian Medicare. Instead, our intention has merely been to highlight the
limitations of negative rights-based health litigation and how such
limitations may be experienced by health consumers on both policy and
service access fronts. We argue that it is the responsibility of advocates and
legal counsels to clearly communicate such realities to the litigants and to
properly manage the complainants' expectations with respect to the legal
action. It should also be understood that advocacy efforts are often required
subsequent to the legal proceedings in order to facilitate treatment access,
or, in Chaoulli-like cases, to ensure the governments do not go beyond what
the courts ordered and forego their responsibilities of guaranteeing health
care access on the basis of need rather than ability to pay.
D. Unsuccessful Litigation, but Positive Policy Outcomes
Whereas the above three types of health rights litigation illustrate the
potential limitations of relying on successful legal challenges to instigate
access to certain health services, the fourth category of health rights
litigation in our typology shows that, conversely, a defeat in the courts does
not necessarily settle these access questions once and for all. Occasionally,
there have been cases that involved particularly sympathetic factual
circumstances, and the publicity surrounding the defeat of these Charter
insurance plan), extra billing (i.e. the practice where health practitioner bills patients for an
amount exceeding what is receivable for the service under the public insurance plan) and
facility fees charged by independent health facilities. See McCreith statement of claim, supra
note 168.
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challenges has generated considerable public backing for the litigants'
causes. As such, even when the lawsuits ultimately turned out to be
unsuccessful for health consumers, they nonetheless succeeded in reshaping
the discursive landscape regarding the health services in question. At times,
the resulting pressure from the public has proven to be so great that it has
led the governments to forfeit a courtroom victory, funding therapies after
being told by the courts that they are not legally obliged to do so. The quest
to have Intensive Behavioural Intervention (IBI) - a form of autism
treatment that incorporates a special technique termed Applied Behavioural
Analysis (ABA) - covered by Medicare is exemplary of this type of health
rights litigation.
In Auton, 72 four preschoolers with autism and their parents launched a
Charter challenge against the province of British Columbia for failing to
fund a comprehensive, universal ABA/IBI program. At the time of trial,
government-financed ABA/IBI programs in British Columbia were limited
to an early intervention program plus a number of autism treatment centres
that offered some behaviour-based therapy. While the former was severely
underfunded and as a result only had a capacity to serve six children, the
latter, according to experts, lacked the necessary intensity, duration, and
early onset to achieve the desired treatment outcomes. 173 Considering that
the cost of well administered ABA/IBI therapy could range between
$45,000 and $60,000 annually, 174 without public coverage, the treatment
would be practically inaccessible to most children with autism. The
plaintiffs argued that intensive, early intervention ABA/IBI programs were
medically necessary for autistic children and should be universally funded
by the public health insurance plan akin to health services similarly required
by children with other forms of disabilities or illnesses. The government's
failure to do so, the plaintiffs alleged, unjustifiably discriminated against
children with autism on the basis of disability and therefore contravened
section 15(1) of the Charter. Both the Supreme Court of British Columbia
and the province's appellate court agreed.
75
The Supreme Court of Canada, however, overturned the lower courts'
rulings and held that the plaintiffs' equality rights were not engaged in this
instance. In the unanimous decision written by McLachlin C.J.C., the Court
172. Auton v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 [Auton], para.
1, 2004 SCC 78 (Can.).
173. Ibid.,Id. at para. 8.
174. Ibid ,Id. atpara. 5.
175. Auton v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2000), 78 B.C.L.R. (3d) 55 (Sup.
Ct.), para. 139, aff'd (2005), [2002] 6 B.C.L.R. (4th) 201 (C.A.), para. 139. But see Donna
Greschner & Steven Lewis, "Auton and Evidence-Based Decision-Making: Medicare in the
Courts", 82 Can. Bar Rev. 501, 506-08 (2003) (criticizing both trial and appellate courts'
decisions in Auton, arguing that public funding for ABA/IBI was not supported by empirical
evidence concerning the cost-effectiveness of the treatment.).
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emphasized that section 15(1) of the Charter merely guaranteed Canadians,
inter alia, "equal benefit of the law without discrimination."' 7 6 Since the
Canada Health Act and the provincial Medicare Protection Act only
required British Columbia to finance medically necessary services
performed at hospitals or provided by physicians, public funding for
ABA/IBI programs - which were delivered by therapists outside of
hospitals - did not amount to a benefit conferred by law and therefore did
not trigger the equality clause in the Charter. The province was legally free
to decide whether to cover ABA/IBI therapy under its public health
insurance plan. As such, Auton was distinguished from Eldridge in that the
latter dealt with differential access to health care services that were
prescribed by law. Furthermore, the Court noted that when compared to
autistic children, non-disabled persons or individuals suffering from a
disability other than autism were equally denied public funding for medical
procedures that were emergent in nature and fell outside of the core health
services defined by law notwithstanding such procedures that might be
important for their health. Therefore, the plaintiffs were said to have failed
in establishing a differential treatment by the government.
Despite having found against the plaintiffs, the plights of children with
autism and their families were apparently not lost on the minds of the
Supreme Court justices. In her judgement, McLachlin C.J.C. actually
acknowledged the forcefulness of the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs
and expressed sympathy for the petitioners' cause. 177 The majority of the
Canadian public also seemed to be in support of the plaintiffs' endeavour in
this case. According to a survey conducted by Ipsos-Reid approximately
one month after the release of the Supreme Court's decision, a staggering
89 percent of Canadians believed that the cost of IBI treatment should be
covered by Medicare.178 This level of support echoed the views expressed
in the opinion editorials, columns and letters-to-the-editor published in the
print media in the wake of Auton, most of which voiced a sense of
disappointment, and at times even outrage, with the court ruling.' 79 One
columnist, however, offered a more positive perspective by observing that
"a lot [had] been gained by the failed legal action" as the Auton case had
"raised public sensibility with respect to autism to a level that governments
176. Charter, supra note 5, s. CAN. CONST. part I, § 15.
177. Auton, supra note 172, 3 S.C.R. 657, at para. 2.
178. "Ipsos-Reid, Canadians support autism treatment" The, Vancouver Sun (21
December, 2004), at B3.
179. See, e.g. John Ivison, "Ottawa must now address another injustice" National Post
(23 November, 2004), at A6 [Ivison]; Justin Himmelright, "Autistic kids deserve better"
National Post (23 November, 2004), at A19; Jennifer Ralph, "Cowardly ruling" Ottawa
Citizen (24 November, 2004), at A 13.
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now [would] be hard-pressed to ignore."'1 80
Indeed, notwithstanding the Auton ruling, the general trend in Canada
has been for the provincial and territorial governments to finance ABA/IBI
programs at least partially. Even before the Auton case went to trial, public
funding for IBI therapy had been made available in Alberta, Ontario, Prince
Edward Island, Newfoundland and Manitoba.1 81 Whereas in British
Columbia, by the time the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, the
province's autism programs already began offering up to $20,000 per year
to families with autistic children under age six to help them purchase
ABA/IBI therapy. For families with autistic children between the ages of
six and eighteen, the province provided up to $6,000 per year per child. 18
2
While the outpour of public support for government-funded ABA/IBI
programs subsequent to the Auton decision did not contribute to these
policy developments, it arguably played a role in preventing these
ABA/IBI-related benefits from being clawed back after the governments'
legal obligations to provide such services were absolved by the Supreme
Court. As a case in point, the public outcry against Auton actually prompted
the British Columbia Minister of State for Early Childhood Development to
respond with an opinion editorial in the National Post, in which she
declared that "[t]he B.C. government [was] committed to continuing to
provide funding and services to children and youth with autism spectrum
disorder" and that "[t]he Supreme Court decision [did] not - and [would]
not - alter that commitment.' ' 183 In fact, across Canada, not only has the
existing public funding for ABA/IBI continued post-Auton, but in some
cases new resources have also been allocated to these treatment programs,
contrary to what one might expect after a failed legal action. For example,
less than two weeks following the release of the Supreme Court's decision,
the government of Nova Scotia announced that it would direct $4 million
towards early intervention IBI therapy. 184 In Ontario, government spending
on services for children and youth with autism more than doubled between
2003 and 2006, allowing the number of children receiving IBI to increase
by approximately 70 percent during this time. 85 By the end of 2006, all
Canadian jurisdictions with the exception of Nunavut provided some public
180. Janice Harvey, "Funding autism therapy is the right thing to do" [Saint John]
Telegraph-Journal (24 November, 2004).
181. Auton, supra note 172, 3 S.C.R. 657, at para. 11.
182. B.C. MINISTRY CHILD. & FAM. DEv., Autism Spectrum Disorder - Autism Programs
(2007), http://www.mcf.gov.bc.ca/specneeds/pdf/eligibilityautism.pdf.
183. Linda Reid, "Autism support" National Post (25 November, 2004), at A23.
184. Department Press Release, Dep't of Health, "Good News for Children with
Autism" News Release (2 December 2004), <https://www.gov.ns.ca/news/details.asp
?id=20041202004>.
185. "Ontario expanding supports for children and youth with autism", News Wire (16
June, 2006), at 1.
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funding towards ABA/IBI therapies. 186
At the federal level, within days of the Auton ruling, several members of
the Canadian Parliament across political parties tabled a petition calling for
the amendment of the Canada Health Act so that provincial funding for
ABA/IBI therapy would be compulsory.' 87 Although such attempts at
legislative reform have not yet been fruitful, since the release of the Auton
decision, a private member's bill seeking for the mandatory funding of
ABA/IBI has been tabled at almost every session of Parliament since the
release of the Auton decision. 188 In addition, a campaign for a national
autism treatment strategy was launched by Senator Jim Munson in the wake
of Auton. 89 In 2006, based on Senator Munson's motion, the issue of
autism treatment funding was referred by the Senate to its Standing
Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology for further study.
190
In the final report published in 2007, the Committee called on the federal
government to collaborate with the provinces and territories to develop a
comprehensive strategy on autism treatment and support, and recommended
that the federal government assist with the financing of autism therapies. 191
Although these developments have not yet yielded concrete policy changes,
they are nonetheless indicative of the success of Auton in placing the issue
of autism treatment funding on the federal government's political agenda.192
186. Odette Madore & Jean-Rodrigue Pare, Provincial and Territorial Funding:
Programs for Autism Therapy Ottawa: Library of Parliament, PRB 06-22E (2006). See also
Hon. Art Eggleton et al., The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science, &
Technology, Final Report on the Enquiry on the Funding for the Treatment of Autism: Pay
Now or Pay Later: Autism Families in Crisis (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 39TH PARL.
(1st Sess. 2007) at 7 [Senate Autism Report]. But see Kristen Yu, "The words within", CTV
News (22 March 2008), <http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ ArticleNews/printlCTVNews/
20080320/WFIVECarlysStory_080320/20080322/?hub=WFive&subhub =
PrintStory> (in addition the to Nunavut, the news article listed Northwest Territories as
having no formal ABA/IBI programs, citing sources from Autism Society of Canada.) [Yu].
187. Ivison, supra note 179, at A6.
188. See Bill C-459, An Act to amend the Canada Health Act (Autism Spectrum
Disorder), 38th ParI., 1st Sess., (2005; Bill); C-304, An Act to provide for the development of
a national strategy for the treatment of autism and to amend the Canada Health Act, 39th
Parl., 1st Sess., (2006; Bill); C-211, An Act to amend the Canada Health Act (Autism
Spectrum Disorder), 39th Parl., 2nd Sess., (2007); C-360, An Act to amend the Canada
Health Act (Autism Spectrum Disorder), 40th Parl., 2nd Sess., (2009).
189. Ivison, supra note 179, at A6.
190. Debate of the Senate (Hansard), Vol. 143, Issue 27 (22 June 2006) at 1800 (Hon.
Noel Kinsella); SEN. DEB., 39th Parl., 1st Sess., at 648 (June 22, 2006).
191. Senate Autism Report, Comm. on Soc. Aff., Sci. & Tech., supra note 186, at 21.
192. For the purpose of our typology, we have narrowly assessed the policy impact of
Auton insofar as it relates to governments' funding towards ABA/IBI programs. However, it
is important to note that in a system of finite resources, the increasing share of public
funding enjoyed by children with autism necessarily implies a corresponding decrease of
resources for some other populations. The "positive policy outcomes" that we seek to
describe in this section should therefore be read in light of this larger context.
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However, in the absence of a national strategy, the extent of funding for
ABA/IBI therapies remains at the discretion of provinces and territories. As
a result, there are significant variations among publicly financed ABA/IBI
programs across the country. Whereas Alberta offers each child with autism
up to $60,000 a year for ABA/IBI treatment until the age of eighteen, in
most provinces ABA/IBI is partially funded and only for autistic children
less than six years of age.193 For example, up until 2005, Ontario's Intensive
Early Intervention Program only provided IBI for children with autism aged
two to five. 19 4 In Wynberg,195 the constitutionality of this age-based funding
scheme in Ontario was challenged by thirty-five autistic children and their
families. The thrust of the plaintiffs' Charter challenge was threefold. First,
they contended that, in contravention of section 15(1) of the Charter,
autistic children age six and over were discriminated against juxtaposed to
those between ages two and five because of their inaccessibility to
government-funded IBI programs. Second, and also on the basis of section
15(1), the Ontario government was said to have discriminated against
school-aged children with autism by failing to provide them with
appropriate special education programs in the form of ABA/IBI while
special education services were made available to children with other forms
of disabilities. Third, the plaintiffs argued that the non-provision of publicly
funded IBI programs deprived autistic children of the right to make
essential life decisions about themselves as well as any reasonable prospect
of meaningful participation in the community, and therefore unjustifiably
violated their right to liberty and security of the person as protected by
section 7 of the Charter.
Many parallels can be drawn between Wynberg and Auton in terms of
juridical outcomes and the policy developments post-litigation. Like Auton,
despite initial successes at trial, the plaintiffs in Wynberg were ultimately
unsuccessful. The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the petitioners' age-
based section 15(1) claim, holding that the age cut-off in this instance was
based on expert findings that suggested autistic children between the ages
of two and five would benefit from the ABA/IBI therapy the most. The
plaintiffs second argument - a disability-based section 15(1) claim -was
refuted for lack of evidence that the existing education services were
inadequate for students with autism and that ABAIIBI constituted the only
appropriate special education program for this population. Lastly, the
193. Yu, supra note 186.
194. Rosemary Thompson, "Ontario removing age limit for autism therapy", CTVNews
(3 September, 2006), http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060901/
autism aba therapy_060701/20060903/.
195. Wynberg v. Ontario, 252 D.L.R. 10 (Can.), rev'd, (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 561 (C.A.),
rev'd (2005), 252 D.L.R. (4th) 10 (Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 31713
(April 12, 2007) [Wynberg], appeal denied, [2007] 234 O.A.C. 397 (Can.).
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petitioners' section 7 claim was dismissed as the court reiterated that
Canadian jurisprudence had not yet founded a positive right upon this
section of the Charter. However, echoing developments surrounding the
Auton decision, the provincial government decided to remove the age limit
from its publicly funded ABA/IBI programs before the Wynberg decision
was released. In response to public confusion post-Wynberg over the
government's commitment to autism funding, the Ontario Minister of
Children and Youth Services wrote an op-ed in the Toronto Star, assuring
Ontarians that "the... government [would] continue to provide services
and support to autistic children regardless of age.' 96 As such, the Wynberg
case represents another example of health rights litigation that failed in the
courtrooms but nonetheless played a part in instigating policy changes
sought-after by health consumers.
While for the purpose of our typology we have highlighted the positive
developments with respect to government funding for ABA/IBI programs
subsequent to Auton and Wynberg, it was not our intention to suggest that
autistic children's access to these therapies have since become problem-
free. Like the situation with many health services, Canadian families are
often faced with long wait times when attempting to access ABA/IBI
programs for their autistic children. For example, in Quebec, children
suspected of having autism could wait for a year or longer before receiving
an official assessment; once diagnosed, it could take these children another
two years to receive publicly funded treatment.' 97 In Ontario, although a
total of 1,400 autistic children were receiving government-funded IBI
therapies in 2008, there were also 1,100 children waiting in line at the same
time. 98 In light of these challenges with service access, we acknowledge
that the present state of the publicly financed ABA/IBI programs falls short
of the comprehensive and universal scheme demanded by the plaintiffs in
Auton and Wynberg. Nevertheless, given that the governments have no
legal obligations to provide ABA/IBI, the level of public funding that the
therapy currently receives is reflective of the extent of support from the
Canadian public on the issue, instigated in part by the failed but highly
publicized lawsuits.
This type of health rights litigation - where unsuccessful Charter
challenges have triggered public support for the health services in question
196. Mary Anne Chambers, "Ontario committed to helping autistic children", Toronto
Star (12 July, 2006), at A23.
197. Charlie Fidelman, "Families hamstrung by wait lists; 'Window of opportunity for
these children is closing"', The Montreal] Gazette (7 April, 2008) at Al.
198. Rob Ferguson, "Autistic children face therapy delay: funding has more than tripled
under Liberals, but expert says it has not kept up with demand", TORONTO STAR (8 August,
2008), at A15.
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- is not unique to the context of autism treatment. The Rodriguez case,1 99
which dealt with the issue of end-of-life care, arguably followed a similar
pattern of juridical and political outcomes. Sue Rodriguez was a 42-year-
old mother who suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, a
neurodegenerative illness commonly known as Lou Gehrig's disease.
During the course of the disease, most patients become bedridden and
gradually lose the ability to speak and to ingest food. In most instances, the
illness is terminal within two to three years of first diagnosis as it causes
wasting of the muscles used in respiration. With her health conditions
rapidly deteriorating, Ms. Rodriguez sought to take control of the
circumstances surrounding her prospective death. She hoped to have an
intravenous device installed by a medical practitioner that would allow her
to end her life at a time of her choosing. To do so, she launched a Charter
challenge to invalidate the criminal prohibition against aiding or abetting a
person to commit suicide, arguing that the blanket ban violated her rights
under sections 7 and 15(1).
In a 5-to-4 decision, however, the Supreme Court of Canada denied Ms.
Rodriguez's request. Although the majority agreed that the right to security
of the person under section 7 of the Charter encompassed the right to make
choices regarding one's own body and to control one's physical and
psychological integrity, it was held that the intrusion into such right by the
criminal provision in question was in line with the principles of
fundamental justice. That is, according to the majority of the Court, the
prohibition against assisted suicide served the important function of
preserving the sanctity of life and protecting the vulnerable in society. As
for Ms. Rodriguez's equality rights argument, the Court found that even if
the concerned criminal sanction contravened section 15 of the Charter, such
infringement was justified under section 1 as it properly struck a balance
between the right to personal autonomy and the society's respect for human
life.
Despite Ms. Rodriguez's unsuccessful legal battle, supporters of assisted
suicide and voluntary euthanasia believed that "she [had] won an incredibly
important victory in single-handedly putting this question of the right to
death with dignity on the national political agenda., 200 In fact, as Ms.
Rodriguez's case was winding through the judicial system, the tragic
circumstances that gave rise to her legal action had brought much media
attention to her case, which in turn generated significant public sympathy
and support for her cause. In 1992, a Gallup Poll result revealed that 77% of
199. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519. (Can).
200. Robin Brunet, "In the Court of Public Opinion: The Rodriguez Case Could Lead to
Softer Laws on Assisted Suicide" (1993), 5:7 B.C. Report 33; see also Margaret Otlowski,
Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Oxford University Press, 1997) at 382
[Otlowski].
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Canadians agreed with the practice of euthanasia when the patient had
previously made a formal request in writing. Another poll conducted in
1993 by Angus Reid found that a comparable 76% of Canadians supported
the right to die for terminal patients who wished to end their lives.
20
'
Further adding to such public sympathy was the fact that, in February
1994, Ms. Rodriguez committed suicide with the assistance of an unnamed
physician. In the wake of her death, the federal government pledged to
allow a free vote in the House of Commons on whether to legalize assisted
suicide and euthanasia.20 2 Although no government-initiated bills on the
subject of end-of-life care have ever been introduced in Parliament, a
number of private member's bills have been tabled over the years, including
several by Svend Robinson, who has become one of the strongest
supporters of Sue Rodriguez's endeavour.20 3 Although these attempts at
legislative change have remained unsuccessful to-date, as in the case of
Auton, they nevertheless reflect the significant pressure faced by Parliament
to act on the issue of assisted dying post-Rodriguez.
Even in the absence of legislative reform, the current legal status of
euthanasia in Canada has been described by experts in the field as "de jure
murder but de facto a considerably less serious crime. 20 4 For example,
Jocelyn Downie's review of cases up to 2001 where the defendants faced
criminal charges for having conducted euthanasia revealed that, out of ten
cases, murder charges were laid in eight, and of these, only in one instance
- namely, R. v. Latimer20 5 - was the defendant actually convicted of murder
201. ld. at 262.
202. Peter O'Neil, "Rodriguez's death brings issue of right to die to forefront of our
national conscience: Free vote of MPs suggested on doctor-assisted suicides" Vancouver Sun
(15 February, 1994) at B6.
203. Marlisa Tiedemann & Dominique Valiquet, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in
Canada, Ottawa: 91 Parliamentary Information and Research Services, 18-20 (2008) at 17-
20 (discussing Robinson's introduction of a bill calling for the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide in December 1992 and again in February 1994 upon Ms. Rodriguez's death).
In 1997, he introduced a motion to have a special committee established for the preparation
of a bill on euthanasia and assisted-suicide. In 2005 and again in 2008, Francine Lalonde
tabled another private member's bill that would have removed criminal sanctions against
assisted suicide under certain circumstances.
204. Jocelyn Downie, Dying Justice: A Case for Decriminalizing Euthanasia and
Assisted Suicide in Canada, Univ. of Toronto Press, at 38 (2008).
205. R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, para. 19-21 (Can.) [Latimer]. Robert Latimer was
charged with second degree murder for having killed his daughter, who had a severe form of
cerebral palsy. He argued that, in so doing, he was helping to alleviate his daughter's
suffering. At trial, the jury convicted Mr. Latimer but recommended a sentence of one-year
imprisonment and one year of probation despite second degree murder carries a mandatory
minimum life sentence with no possibility of parole for 10 years. Upon appeal, the sentence
given by the jury was overturned and the mandatory minimum sentence was imposed by
both the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada. Although the end
result of the Latimer case seems to go against the proposition that euthanasia has become de
facto a less serious crime than murder, judging by the original sentence imposed by the jury,
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and sentenced to a prison term.2 °6 Cases since Downie's study have
generally resulted in similar outcomes. 0 7 As recent as in December 2008, a
Quebec man was acquitted by the jury for assisting his disabled uncle to
commit suicide.20 8 While we may reasonably suspect that the Rodriguez
case and the outflow of public support thereafter might have contributed to
this jurisprudential trend, the impact of Rodriguez was most clearly
demonstrated in the case of R. v. de la Rocha.20 9 In 1993, after taking part in
the suicide of a terminally ill patient, Dr. Alberto de la Rocha arranged a
plea bargain with the Crown where he pled guilty to the charge of
administering a noxious thing in exchange of the prosecution dropping the
second degree murder charge. According to the prosecutor, one of the
motivations for agreeing to the plea bargain was "the fact that the Sue
Rodriguez case was unfolding at the same time and the Gallup Polls were
indicating that eight out of ten favoured her.' '210 In the end, Dr. de la Rocha
was given three years of probation. As such, though it has not yet brought
about legislative change, the Rodriguez case arguably has effected the
liberalization of the blanket criminal sanction against assisted suicide and
voluntary euthanasia insofar as it has been able to influence the
prosecutorial discretion and the views of jurors.
E. Unsuccessful Litigation, and Lost Political Momentum
While cases like Auton, Wynberg, and Rodriguez illustrate the possibility
for health consumers to obtain the desired medical services through
political means despite unsuccessful attempts at establishing a legal
entitlement, they should not be misconstrued as suggesting that there are no
downsides to launching Charter-based health rights litigation. Naturally, in
the absence of significant public pressure, the tendency is for governments
to treat the failed legal actions by health consumers as conclusive in the
debate of whether to fund the services in question. Advocates who
subsequently seek to obtain public funding through political recourse are
therefore faced with at least two sizable hurdles. On the one hand, they need
to convince the governments that, notwithstanding the lack of legal
it would appear that at least some jurors indeed see the offence of euthanasia in such light.
206. Downie, supra note 204, at 38-43.
207. McCreith, supra note 165, at 11-12. For example, in 2004, Evelyn Martens was
acquitted by a British Columbia court for assisting in the suicides of two terminally ill
elderly women. That same year, Marielle Houle was sentence by a Quebec court to three
years of probation for aiding and abetting the suicide of her 36-year-old son. In 2006, an
Ontario man also received three years' probation for helping his wife commit suicide.
208. Marianne White, "Quebec man acquitted in assisted suicide case; Ottawa under
renewed pressure to change law," Edmonton Journal (13 December, 2008), at A4.
209. R. v. de la Rocha, (1993), WL 1447201 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
210. Downie, supra note 204, at 39-40.
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obligations to do so, financing the said medical procedures would be in
their best interest. On the other hand, given that juridical findings also carry
considerable weight in the court of public opinion, advocates need to
persuade Canadians as well that some injustice has been done and that their
endeavour to request government funding serves the public interest and thus
deserves the public backing. When failing to meet such challenges,
unsuccessful health rights litigation could stifle public discourses
concerning the medical services in question and set back political
momentum towards obtaining governmental funding that has been built up
hitherto. The issue of whether to cover assisted reproductive technologies
under Canadian Medicare, which was at the centre of the Cameron case,"'
is an example of this last category of our typology.
Alex Cameron, a lawyer, and Cheryl Smith, a medical doctor, were a
married couple who had had difficulties conceiving. As a result, Mr.
Cameron took part in four cycles of intra cytoplasmic sperm injection
(ICSI) - a specialized form of in vitro fertilization (IVF) - while Ms. Smith
underwent two frozen embryo transfers. After incurring approximately
$40,000 in medical costs, the couple remained unsuccessful in their
attempts at conception.21 2 In 1997, they launched a Charter challenge
against the province of Nova Scotia demanding the outlays of their fertility
treatments be reimbursed and the costs of IVF and ICSI be covered under
the public insurance plan. Their argument was two-fold: IVF and ICSI
should be considered medically necessary procedures as stipulated in the
Canada Health Act and the province's Health Services and Insurance
Act;2 13 and, even if such medical treatments could not be so characterized,
the denial of coverage was in violation of section 15(1) of the Charter as it
discriminated against infertile individuals relative to those who are fertile.
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal rejected the Camerons' claim. Relying
on the testimonies of medical experts, the Court opined that IVF and ICSI
were not medically necessary because of their high costs, limited success
rates and the health risks involved therein. With respect to the plaintiffs'
Charter challenge, the majority of the court ruled that the government's
refusal to fund IVF and ICSI indeed amounted to a violation of the
plaintiffs' equality rights. That is, considering that fertile couples enjoyed
full coverage of birth-related health services under Medicare, the plaintiffs
were treated differently because of their physical disability and such
differential treatment furthered the existing vulnerability of infertile
persons, thus undermining their human dignity. Yet, the judges went on to
211. Cameron v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1999] 204 N.S.R. (2d) 1, (C.A.)
[Cameron].
212. Id. at para. 8-9.
213. Health Services and Insurance Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.h. 197 (2008).
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hold that the breach of section 15(1) by the provincial government in this
case was justifiable under section 1. They found that the government's
objective to control health care costs were pressing and substantial, and by
refusing to fund IVF and ICSI but not other infertility treatments, the means
taken by the government herein was proportionate to the end of cost
containment.
As the plaintiffs' request for leave to appeal the decision was denied by
the Supreme Court of Canada in 2001,214 the appellate court's ruling in
Cameron has become the leading Canadian case law in regards to health
consumers' right, or lack thereof, to publicly funded IVF and ICSI
procedures. Since the Cameron decision, there remains no jurisdiction in
Canada that funds ICSI, and public coverage of the costs of IVF has been
minimal. As a program that predates Cameron, Ontario pays IVF through
its public health insurance plan, but only for women with complete
blockages in both Fallopian tubes and for a maximum of three cycles. 21 5
According to statistics from 2006, only 10% of IVF performed in Ontario
and 5% in Canada were paid for publicly.216 In 2009, ten years after
Cameron, Quebec will become just the second province in Canada where
women will have access to Medicare-funded IVF treatments for up to three
attempts.217
214. Cameron, supra note 211, 204 N.S.R.2d 1, at para. 246.
215. Elizabeth Payne, "OHIP falls under the knife", Ottawa Citizen (18 February, 1994),
at Al; see Natalie Alcoba, The Right to Bear Children; Politics, Ethics Muddy Couple's
Fight for Fertility Treatment, NAT'L POST, Aug. 22, 2009, at Al (The legality of Ontario's
IVF funding scheme, however, is currently being contested. In August 2009, Amir Attaran
and his wife Ana Ilha filed a complaint with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario. They
alleged that the IVF funding restrictions in Ontario discriminates against infertile individuals
and therefore violates the provincial human rights code.); Jeff Nisker, Socially Based
Discrimination against Clinically Appropriate Care, 181 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 764, 764
(2009) Al. (In an editorial published in September 2009, the Canadian Medical Association
Journal (CMAJ) - of whose Editorial-Writing Team Attaran is a member - came out in
support of Attaran's human rights complaint, arguing that public funding of IVF would
reduce the need for infertile women to have multiple embryos implanted at once and
therefore would decrease the costs associated with multiple births.); Similar economic
arguments have been cited by the Ontario Expert Panel on Infertility and Adoption in its
August 2009 report, which recommended the provision of "public funding for three cycles of
IVF under certain conditions." See "Expert panel releases report on infertility and adoption
in Ontario" CNW Group (26 August 2009), <http://www.cnw.ca/en/releases/archive/
August2009/26/c7687.html>. Judging from these recent developments, it would appear that,
a decade after Cameron, advocacy efforts to have IVF publicly funded are finally picking up
momentum again. However, as noted in the CMAJ editorial, public support on this issue
seems to have remained questionable. Given such lacklustre public sentiment, it begs the
question whether Attaran's legal action, if turns out to be unsuccessful, may run the risk of
setting back the political movement as Cameron did.
216. Edward Hughes, "Access to Effective Fertility Care in Canada" (2008), 30 J. GRICS
& GYNAECOLOGY, Can. 389 at 390 (2008).
217. Id. (explaining that prior to the policy change, Quebec had been offering a
refundable tax credit of up to $6,000 per annum to couples for costs associated with IVF);
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Such low level of state funding for assisted reproductive technologies
sets Canada starkly apart from most other countries that also have a
universal health care system. 218 For example, since 2000, Australia's
Medicare Safety Net has been offering an 80 percent rebate on the costs of
IVF with no restrictions on the number of treatment cycles that a woman
can undergo .2 9 Beginning in 2006, the Australian government also funds
ICSI as a treatment for severe male infertility. 220 In New Zealand, qualified
female patients currently receive public funding for up to two cycles of
IVF;221 since 1998, the government has been covering the expenses of ICSI
as well where the procedure is required in conjunction with IVF.222 Many
European countries similarly provide funding for IVF. In the U.K., where
access to publicly financed IVF has been found to be among the lowest in
Europe,223 the National Institute for Clinical Excellence recommends the
provision of up to three cycles of IVF by the National Health Service to
qualified women, 224 and almost all primary care trusts now offer at least one
Ingrid Peritz, Kissing Babies Isn't Enough, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 22, 2008, at F3 (After years
of advocacy campaign - which has significantly benefited from the support of Julie Snyder,
a high-profile TV personality in Quebec - during the 2008 provincial election campaign
Premier Jean Charest pledged to expand Quebec's health care coverage to include two cycles
of IVF if re-elected. According to his campaign platform, couples who require more IVF
treatments after the two publicly funded attempts would continue to receive the tax credit.);
Environics Communications, Ontario Standing Still while Quebec Meets Election Promise
by Funding In-vitro Fertilization, CNW GROup, April 24, 2009. After having won the
election, in April 2009, the Quebec government sought to fulfill its campaign promise by
introducing Bill 26, An Act respecting clinical and research activities relating to assisted
procreation, 1st Sess., 39th Leg., Quebec, 2009 (assented to 19 June 2009). According to the
government announcement, the new Quebec program will pay for up to three cycles of IVF
treatments.
218. Jeff Nisker, "Distributive Justice and Infertility Treatment in Canada" (2008), 30 J.
GRics & GYNAECOLOGY, Can. 425 at 426 (2008); See also Edward G. Hughes & Mita
Giacomini, "Funding In Vitro Fertilization Treatment for Persistent Subfertility: The Pain
and the Politics", 76 Fertility & Sterility 431 at 432 (2001).
219. See Hughes & Giacomini, supra note 218; see also Melissa Jenkins, "Fed: IVF
public funding cuts rumoured ahead of May budget", Associated Press General News (7
May, 2009); Julie Robotham, "Budget removes safety net for IVF parents", Sydney Morning
Herald (8 May, 2009). However, in May 2009, the Australian government introduced a cap
on the amount of rebate that one can claim each year from the Medicare Safety Net for IVF
costs.
220. Carol Nader, "Public funds to stay in fertility treatment" The Age (30 November,
2006), at 5.
221. MINISTRY OF AGRIC. AND FORESTRY, "Funding for Second IVF Cycle" Rural
Bulletin 7 (August 2004), available at http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/ publications/
ruralbulletinl>.aug-04/aug-04-06.htm.
222. NEW ZEALAND PRESS Ass'N, "HFA Changes Fertility Treatment Criteria" (12 July
1998).
223. "UK nearly last among European countries offering access to IVF" The Herald (2
July 2009), <http://www.theherald.co.uk/misc/print.php?artid=2517651 >.
224. National Institute for Clinical Excellence, Assessment and Treatment for People
with Fertility Problems: Understanding NICE Guidance - Information for People with
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free IVF treatment cycle.225
In addition to going against the international trend, the dearth of public
funding for IVF in Canada runs afoul of the recommendations put forth by
the country's Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies.
Struck by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1989, the Royal Commission
was tasked with investigating the public interest implications of emerging
reproductive technologies, including IVF. In its final report published in
1993, the Royal Commission found, inter alia, that "[t]he importance of
having children [was] such, that if there [were] safe and effective ways to
help people otherwise unable to achieve that goal, Canadians [thought] that
in a caring society they should be provided. ' ' 226 The Royal Commission
went on to find that, among all the evidence related to IVF that were
available, the effectiveness of the medical procedure was best demonstrated
in helping women with complete Fallopian tube blockages overcome their
infertility. As such, it was strongly recommended that IVF for this group of
women be funded by the government-run health insurance plans.22 7
The Cameron decision, in our opinion, has significantly contributed to
the present funding void in Canada with respect to IVF and ICSI. Foremost,
the court's finding that IVF and ICSI do not constitute medically necessary
procedures means the decision to fund is wholly at the discretion of
provincial governments. As such, while other western countries have
moved in the opposite policy direction, Canadian provinces have continued
to rely on such characterization of IVF and ICSI as a reason to refuse
coverage. For instance, the British Columbia Ministry of Health has
maintained the position that "the Medical Services Plan relied on the advice
of the medical profession in determining the medical necessities of
procedures. To date, there has been no indication from the medical
,,228profession that it considers IVF to be medically necessary. Moreover,
the Cameron court explicitly mentioned in its decision the Royal
Commission's call for public financing of IVF.229 The court's subsequent
holding that the government's refusal to cover IVF expenses is justified on
the ground of cost containment, even in situations where women are
diagnosed with blocked Fallopian tubes, effectively permits the provinces
and territories to carry on ignoring the recommendations from the Royal
Fertility Problems, Their Partners and the Public, (Feb. 2004).
225. Funding for Fertility in the U.K. - Interactive Map: Does your PCT or Health
Board Follow the NICE/EAGISS Guideline? (June 2008) <http://www.infertility
networkuk.com/ FundingforFertility/>.
226. Patricia Baird, "Proceed with Care: New Reproductive Technologies and the Need
for Boundaries", 12 J. Assisted Reproduction. & Genetics 491, 493 (1995).
227. Id. at 494.
228. Hughes, supra note 216, at 389.
229. R. v. de la Rocha, WL 1447201 (Ont. Gen. Div.). at para 99, 203 (1993).
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Commission so long as they toll the bell of tight resources. Any political
momentum that the Royal Commission had contributed towards the quest
for public IVF funding was arguably lost.
At the same time, the Cameron case did not appear to be as successful as
Auton and Rodriguez in regards to enlisting public support for the plaintiffs'
plight. In fact, in comparison to the outpour of public sympathy in the wake
of Auton and Rodriguez, the public response to the Cameron case seemed
relatively mute. A review of the print media yielded only a handful of
opinion editorials and letters to the editors that commented on the lawsuit,
most of which questioned the medical necessity of infertility treatments and
disapproved of the Camerons' demand for public IVF funding.23°
Consequently, the governments have been under little pressure to deviate
from the status quo and have been satisfied with simply relying on the
Cameron ruling as the bottom line concerning IVF and ICSI funding.
In the end, by losing their legal battle, the Camerons not only failed to
have their medical costs reimbursed but also inadvertently stifled, at least
for a notable period of time, the political movement towards Medicare-
funded IVF. From this perspective, cases in this last category of our
typology arguably represent the worst case scenario for health consumers.
Therefore, parties interested in launching Charter-based health rights
litigation should be adequately informed of this potential outcome so that it
may be weighed against the benefits sought. That is, in addition to assessing
the soundness of their legal arguments, prospective litigants should
contemplate questions such as: Is the political landscape going to be
sympathetic towards their endeavour? And, if their legal action turns out
unsuccessful, will there be an organized advocacy campaign ready to step in
and continue pursuing the cause through political means? If the answers to
these questions are negative, the lessons learned from cases like Cameron
suggest that health consumers should seriously consider if there are other
avenues besides Charter challenges, for example through administrative
law or lobbying, that can equally resolve the funding issues in question but
may involve less downside risks.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined the growing number of cases in Canada in
which health consumers seek to rely on their Charter rights to gain access
to certain therapies or to care within reasonable wait times. Our main
concern is that, as Canadian courts become increasingly willing to entertain
230. See, e.g. J.J. Forrestal, "In vitro not a necessity", Globe and Mail (29 July 1998), at
A14; Naomi Lakritz, "Infertile couples not covered under the Charter; Governments do not
owe couples babies, no matter how much the couples think they deserve them", Calgary
Herald (18 February, 1999), at A 16.
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health rights-based claims and thus being implicated in the allocation of
health resources, there is a corresponding need for a more holistic
assessment of how the rights discourse is impacting on Canadian Medicare.
Is health rights litigation facilitating a more progressive distribution of
health resources in favour of marginalized groups that are in greatest need?
Or, is the pursuit of health rights having a regressive effect on the universal
health care system as some health law and policy scholars have feared?
According to Aeyal Gross, tensions exist between a human rights enterprise
that has traditionally focused on the individuals and universal health care
systems that are founded upon collective aspirations. 31 By resorting to
individualistic rights, health consumers run the risk of inviting the courts to
focus on a narrow set of facts and to ignore the larger context in which a
public health care system must operate, namely the need to prioritize
competing interests under resource constraints. Moreover, as access to
justice often favours those with resources, health rights litigation may in
turn be exploited to recreate the same access imbalance in the health care
setting.232 So, how does the rights discourse unfold in Canadian Medicare in
reality? To properly answer this question, we argue that one has to look
beyond the juridical outcomes of the cases and consider also the policy
developments following the conclusion of legal proceedings, and hence our
typology.
Many legal commentators who examined the Charter jurisprudence
surrounding access to care have suggested that Canadians' pursuit of the
right to health has largely rendered Medicare more regressive than
progressive. For example, by juxtaposing the Chaoulli decision with Auton,
Sujit Choudhry has described the current state of health rights in Canada as:
"those who can afford private health care have won the right to exit the
system, while those trapped in the system without the means to exist get no
help at all."233 Analysis of the outcomes of Canadian health rights litigation
based on our typology which also takes into account the policy fallout post-
litigation, however, reveals a more nuanced finding. While Chaoulli
undoubtedly illustrates how the rights-based approach may be used to
enable queue jumping for those that can afford to pay, Choudhry's
observation that less resourced individuals "get no help at all" arguably
231. Aeyal M. Gross, "The Right to Health in an Era of Privatisation and Globalisation",
in Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice 289 (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal
M. Gross, eds, 2007).
232. Donna Greschner, "Charter Challenges and Evidence-Based Decision Making in
the Health Care System: Towards a Symbiotic Relationship", in Just Medicare: What's In,
What's Out, How We Decide 42, 44 (Colleen M. Flood, ed., 2006).
233. Sujit Choudhry, "Worse than Lochner?", in Access to Care, Access to Justice: The
Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada, 75, 94. (Colleen M. Flood, Kent
Roach & Lome Sossin, eds., 2005).
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requires further delineation. In Auton and Wynberg, although the rights
claimants were denied legal recourses, they were ultimately successful in
acquiring the sought-after therapies through political means. Whereas in
Cameron, not only was the litigation unsuccessful but it also undercut the
reform efforts launched outside of the courtroom for a significant period of
time. It appears that the denial of a rights claim, like the pronouncement of
a right, carries with it normative and rhetorical significance and, among the
socially marginalized groups, those less vocal and less organized would
tend to be worst positioned in shielding their advocacy efforts from such
repercussions.23 4
Furthermore, our typology suggests that when taking the policy
implications into consideration, the progressive potential of successful
health rights litigation - such as Eldridge, Morgentaler, Parker and PHS -
has thus far been severely circumscribed. On the one hand, negative rights
have a limited effect on facilitating access to care. As seen in the aftermath
of Morgentaler, decriminalization alone neither guarantees public funding
of the therapies in question nor ensures service provision, leaving health
consumers - particularly those less resourced - with essentially an empty
right. On the other hand, a positive right to therapy can be in danger of
being under-enforced in the absence of a judicial mechanism that properly
supervises the state's remedial measures. When one contrasts the provinces'
underperformance of their positive obligations post-Eldridge with Quebec's
initial plan post-Chaoulli to liberalize the restrictions on private health care
beyond what the Supreme Court of Canada had required, the potential for
health rights litigation to instigate a more progressive distribution of health
resources in Canada becomes highly suspect.
In sum, analysis based on our typology illustrates that one needs to
examine both legal and policy outcomes of health right litigation to
determine whether a progressive or regressive change has been effected.
We echo Aeyal Gross in arguing that "[r]ealising rights is not a simple
matter; indeed, it is the outcome of complex negotiations between different
entities, public and private, and is effected through vigorous political and
legal work., 235 As such, if the pursuit of health rights and the scholarly
analysis thereof become solely concerned with the juridical decisions, one
runs the risk of either missing the nuanced impact of a rights paradigm on
marginalized groups, or being complacent with a pronouncement of rights
that may be hollow in reality. As a logical next step, we propose that this
typology be used to review health rights litigation in other countries. Such
234. R. v. de la Rocha, (1993) WL 1447201 (Ont, Gen. Div.). at para. 299. According to
Gross, "we must recall that rights have normative and rhetorical significance in any
discussion of society's responses to human needs." Arguably, when a rights claim is denied
by courts, the decision carries with it a similar normative and rhetorical significance.
235. Id.
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an exercise may allow us to gauge whether countries with an expressed
constitutional right to health enjoy greater successes in realizing progressive
health funding allocation. It may also shed light on how a health rights
discourse unfolds when it is invoked in an administrative law, rather than
constitutional law, context. Furthermore, a comparative analysis between
developed and developing countries may reveal the extent to which a rights-
based approach could be influenced by resources available. Through such a
holistic examination, we will then be able to properly scrutinize the right to
health and steer it towards a more progressive path.
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